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ABSTRACT 
A summary of tl'B revolutions of 1910 and 1913 which respectively 
removed Porfirio Diaz and Francisco Yladero from the presidency of Mexico 
and the ilnplication of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson comprise the 
introductory chapter. A detailed analysis was made of the diplomacy of 
President Woodrow Wilson as it affected the Provisional Presidency of 
Victoriano Huerta as well as the personalities in Wilson's cabinet, 
the American State Department, and Mexican officialdom. It is the 
contention of the writer that a major departure occurred in American 
traditional policy of recognition, which was formerly based on a 
nation's ability to maintain law, order, and stability, but under 
President Wilson shifted to constitutional legitimacy. The motives 
and circumstances that led to the occupation of Vera Cruz by United 
States Marines and the mediatory conference at Niagara, Canada, was 
also given careful study. 
Due to the r eluctance on the part of Mexican sources of 
information in disseminating materials pertinent to the topic of 
this thesis, research was confined to United States documents and 
sources written in English. Primary sources were: Papers Relating 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Congressional Record, 
The New York Times, ani various monographic works. Until the private 
papers of .Ambassador Wilson are released, tre writer feels that a 
complete understanding of American diplomacy can not be obtained by 
the student of this period . 
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The years 1910 to 1916 were eventful for the American people; 
encompassing the Progressive movement with its accompanying reforms; 
the pre-World War I years, and a period of history in which the 
United States further cracked its cocoon of isolationism, a policy 
adhered to since the presidencies of George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson. A measure of isolationism as a national policy was lost 
in the Spanish-American War, in diplomatic relations with Mexico, 
World War I and World War II, and completely cast aside by the 
Truman Doctrine of 1947. It is the purpose of this study to set 
forth and analyze the Mexican phase of the United States emergence 
as a world power, emphasizing the diplomacy of President Woodrow 
Wilson and his policy of recognition toward the Provisional Govern-
ment of Victoriano Huerta. No attempt has been made to present the 
minutiae of diplomatic events, ranging from border incidents to 
migratory birds, which occurred between the United States and Mexico 
from 1910 to 1916. The writer has traced, in a cursory manner, 
the major political events that highlighted the last years of Porfirio 
Diaz, the revolution of Francisco Madero, and the coup d 1~tat of 
Victoriano Huerta. A detailed examination was made of United States 
diplomatic relations with Mexico during the Provisional Presidency 
of Huerta. Subsequent to the removal of Huerta from the Mexican 
scene by the policies of Woodrow Wilson and the military victories 
of the Constitutionalists, a brief summary of events leading to the 
ii 
formal recognition of Venustiano Carranza has been presented. It is 
historically indefensible, until recent documents are released, to 
assert that contemporary problems of recognition stem from Wilson 's 
departure from traditional .IAmerican policies of recognition; however, 
it is important to examine the conditions that shaped that departure 
and the ramifications of it. 
Research was primarily confined to Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Rel ctions of the United States, the Congressional Record, 
! Compilation of tbe Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
monographic works, and The New York Times. To exhaust adequately 
the material relative to this subject would require work in the 
Archives of the United States and Mexico, procurement of the State 
Department Papers, and access to private papers and libraries. It 
is believed by this writer that a complete understanding of American-
Mexican relations of the Madero-Huerta-Carranza-Wilson period can 
never be attained until the complete papers and machinations of 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson are made accessible to the student of 
the period. 
Acknowledge~nt is made to Professor Eugene R. Craine whose 
patient proofreading and critical analysis has proved invaluable to 
the completion of this thesis, and whose dynamic presentation of 
history in the classroom was instrumental in the writer's decision to 
pursue that course of stuey. 
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Additional acknowledgement is extended to Miss Margaret 
Van Ackeran whose help in locating documentary material is sincerely 
appreciated, arrl to JT\Y wife, Doris, who proofread, made helpful sug-
gestions, and typed the initial copies. 
CHAPTER I 
THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1910 AND 1913 
For thirty years Porfirio D{az had ruled Mexico with an 11iron 
hand11 that crushed opposition to his regime and granted lavish 
concessions to foreign investors. In 1884 the old Spanish laws 
which declared mineral wealth to be the proper-cy- of the state were 
repealed by a mining code which bestowed sub-surface coal and oil 
l 
resources to the owner of surface lands, thereby ma.king it easy 
for D{az to grant concessions of coal and oil to foreign investors 
by selling them land. Capital from the United States poured into 
Mexico and by 1912 American2 investments in Mexico were in excess of 
one billion dollars. The total assets of Mexico at that date were 
approximately two and a half billion dollars; thus, AnBrican capital 
amounted to nearly one half of that amount. 3 It is obvious that 
Mexican affairs were of vital interest to the United States which 
not only had huge financial interests in tm country, but al.so about 
1Henry B. Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Compa.ey, 1938), p.-289. Hereinafter cited as Parkes, 
History of Mexico. 
2In this study the term .American 'Will refer only to the 
United States. 
3Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage 
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942T, pp. 559-560. 




forty thousand of its citizens living there. 
As Dtaz approached the end of his thirtieth year as President 
of Mexico, he was aware of the tremendous power of United States 
capital in Mexico and tried to counterbalance it by giving lucrative 
concessions to the British, who already had sizeable investroonts 
there, hoping, in this manner, to create hostile competition between 
the British and Americans and thereby diminish the power of both, 
especially that of the United States. This action was viewed with 
hostili-cy by American companies who looked to President William 
Howard Taft to support their interests. On No-vember 19, 1910, Diaz 
asked the United States to prevent ~iexican revolutionary movements 
from organizing on American soil; his request was ignored. 4 This 
is an excellent example of diplomacy of inaction that is, in reality, 
action, for tre refusal on the part of the United States to observe 
neutrality lent a sanctuaxy to Mexicans who sought to oust the Old 
Dictator. 
Francisco Madero, an idealist, a reformer, and an outspoken 
critic of the Diaz policies of granting lavish concessions to 
foreigners at the expense of tre !-1e.xican people was successful in 
organizing an insurrection. Madero found sympathetic support among 
4J. Fred Rippy, Josi Vasconcelos, and Guy Stevens, .koorican 
Policies Abroad: Mexico ( Chicago: The Universi W of Chicago 
Press, 1928), p. 11. Hereinafter cited as Rippy, Me.xioo. 
3 
American companies who were opposed to his idealism, but angry wi. th 
Diaz because of his preferential treatment of British capital. Ai;-
cording to L. S. Rowe, "It was this change in the policy of General 
Diaz [p{ail. which enabled Francisco Madero to count on the secret 
support of at least come of the American companies interested in 
Mexico. 115 With his base of operatioIE north of the R{o Grande del 
Norte, abetted by support of American capital, and the purchase of 
munitions in the United States, Madero led an amazingly successful 
revolution. Soma Americans felt that the success of the Madero revolt 
could be attributed to discontent among the oppressed Mexican people, 
and that the overthrow of Diaz was made possible by popular sentiment 
against the conditions under which too majority of too Mexican people 
lived. That these conditions were deplorable there can be little 
disagreement. 6 Mexico was predominately an agricultural nation, 
but in 1910 only three per cent of the people owned land. The 
average wage fer three million agricultural workers was thirty-five 
cents per d83", and conditions on the tobacco and henequen plantations 
51. S. Rowe, "The Scope and Limits of Our Obligations Toward 
Mexico, 11 The Annals: International Relations of the United States, 
LIV (July, 19i4)., P• 223. - -
6Henry Lane Wilson claimed that while foreign investors had 
received lucrative profits from Mexican concessions., even greater 
returns had been reaped by Mexico: See Henry Lane Wilson, "Errors 
with Reference to Mexico and Events That H,ave Occurred There, 11 
The Annals: International Relations of the United States, LIV 
(July, 1914), PP• iliB-161. - -
were "not far removed from slavery.n7 Nevertheless, it is ques-
tionable that these oppressive conditions were the primary moti-
vating factors behind Madero I s support from the Mexican populace. 
4 
His mild political reforms meant very little to the uneducated masses; 
although he w~ hailed with shouts of II i Viva Madero! i Viva la ----
democracia! 11 as he moved southward toward the Mexican capital. 
/ .American correspondent John Reed reported that he overheard one peon 
ask another what this "democracia11 was, and the reply was, "Why, it 
must be the lady who ac;_companies him" referring to Madero's wife! 
Reed asked another peon what he was fighting for, and the reply was, 
"Why it is good, fighting. You don't have to work in the mines. 118 
In reality, the n{az government collapsed not because it was 
crushed by a popular revolt, but due to degeneration and corruption. 
The old fogies of the U>iaz] cabinet, grown stiff wi. th 
age and inaction, were worse than useless. The arJl\Y was honey-
combed with padded muster rosters and petty larceny. More 
than half the roster were men of straw who were clothed and 
armed at regular rates, but from whom no bugler , not even 
Gabriel himself, could bring forth an answering "here. 119 
On May 25, 1911, Porfirio D{az resigned md was carried into 
exile by the German freighter, Ypiranga,10 which was to have a more 
7Rippy, Mexico, p. 5. 
8As quoted in Gruening, Mexico, PP• 96-97 • 
9 As quoted in Rippy, Mexico, p. 6. 
10stuart A. MacCorkle, .American Policy of Recognition Towards 
Mexico (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), P• 82. 
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significant role in the future relatiom of the United States With 
Mexico. Francisco de la Barra was appointed Provisional President 
until an election could be held. He was the oholce of Taft and the 
American "captains of industry'' to become the legally constituted 
President, but they were willing to accept Madero until a more favor-
able candidate could be found. 11 
It is obvious that the United States was implicated in the 
removal of Diaz from power., and it is equally obvious what the fate 
of any Mexican President would be who was not endorsed by Washington. 
Madero, following his election in October of 1911, was soon 
beset by serious problems, not the least of which was the incongruity 
of his frail stature and shrill voice., in a country which venerates 
the 11strong man." Because he lacked the power to dispossess foreign 
land holders, he was unable to bring about land reform as he had 
promised, and he also failed to break up the church estates and 
divide the large haciendas. He was guilty of nepotism in appointing 
members of his family to positions in his cabine t . While this was 
not an unusual procedure in Mexico, it nevertheless left Madero 
vulnerable to harsh criticism. 
In spite of many- serious problems and biting criticism, 
Madero might have held office throughout his term if it had not been 
for interference on the part of United States Ambassador to Mexico., 
11Rippy, Mexico, PP• 11-12. 
6 
Henry Lane Wilson. Ambassador Wilson's appointment was due to the 
influence of his brother, Senator Jolm M. Wilson, who was a close 
political associate of Richard Ballinger. Ballinger, Taft's first 
Secretary of the Interior, had "intimate relationship" with the 
Guggenheim family who controlled the American Smelting and Refining 
Company and had sizeable investments in Mexico. These investzoonts 
came into conflict with the smelting and refining interests of the 
Madero fami1y. 12 In January of 1912, only four months after Madero 
had been elected President of Mexico, Ambassador Wilson reported that 
Mexico was a hotbed of discontent and warned Americans to leave certain 
parts of Mexico which he considered unsafe. The areas referred to were 
so ambiguous that ttey virtually c onsti tu ted all of Mexico •13 On 
August 22, l912, he wrote to Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox 
that "• •• disorders [are] becoming more general; violence of the 
most barbarous character daily occurring. The Government [ is] 
apparently incompetent to meet the situation. •1114 If violence 
was as widespread as Ambassador Wilson claimed, it is logical to 
assume that American diplomatic posts throughout Mexico would have 
reported sromewhat similar circumstances, but this was not the case. 
12Gruelti.ng, Mexico, p. 561. 
13Parkes, History of Mexico, p. 330. 
14.Ambassador Hemy Lane "Wilson to Secretary of State Philander 
Chase Knox, (telegram), August 22, 1912. Pap(rs Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912 Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 826. Hereinafter cited 
as FR. 
7 
Ambassador Wilson's criticism could only be regarded throughout 
Mexico as proof that the United States did not approve of the Madero 
15 
government. According to Professor Ernest Gruening, " • the 
effect on the fortunes of the Maderos was highly unfavorable. It 
breathed life into every latently hostile group or person. It en-
16 couraged banditry. It actively stimulated rebellion." Mexican 
revolutionaries knew that the revolutions of Benito Jufu-ez, Porfirio 
D{az, and Francisco Madero were organized and launched from American 
soil, and if the .American .Ambassador was inimical to Madero - an 
insurrection might be favorably regarded in the United States. 
The first revolt against the Madero government originated in 
Texas under the leadership of Bernardo Reyes, who had been in 
Europe at the time of the Madero revolt. Reyes was forced, by 
United States officials friendly to Madero., to leave the sanctuary of 
the United States before his plans were fully matured. His revolt 
was easily crushed due to lack of support and be was imprisoned in 
Mexico City •17 A subsequent revolt originated :i the Mexican states 
of Coahuila and Chih1h::ahu.a. under tre leadership of Emi.lo V cisquez Gbmez 
15The Mexican Herald, an AnBrican owned newspaper., circulated 
the anti-lfadero sentiment throughout the country. Rippy, Mexico., 
PP• 107-109. 
16Gruening, Mexico, p. 562. 
17Howard F. Cline., The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press., 1953), p. 126. 
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and Pascual Orozco.18 The Gtimez-Crozco revolution is of little 
significance per ~, but it summoned to the Mexican scene General 
Victoriano Huerta who, in a series of brilliant campaigns, stamped 
out the insurrection and became a military hero. Huerta was a full-
blooded Indian who had entered military service in 1872 at the age 
of twenty. He was thoroughly indoctrinated with D:faz 11principles 11 
of "shoot first and take no prisoners. 1119 He was an ardent admirer 
of Napoleon, and shared Ulysses Grant's love, if not wea.lmess, for 
liquor. Huerta furthered his mill tary reputation by crushing an 
abortive revolution led by Ftlix Dfaz and incarcerating its leader 
in the capital city. 
In most civilized nations, men 'Who lead unsuccessful revolu-
tions are brought to trial and executed. In Mexico, such men were 
summarily shot by Porfirio Diaz without benefit of legal proceedings; 
however, Madero foolishly imprisoned Bernardo Reyes and Filix Dfaz 
pending their trials. 
On February 9, 1913, disloyal soldiers o ganized by Rodolfo 
Reyes, the son of Bernardo, effected the release of Reyes and D{az 
from their respective prisons. General Reyes led the insurgents in 
a siege of the 1 ational Palace, def ended by General Lauro Villar, 
18Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New 
York: McBride, Nast arrl Company, 19i£), p. 20. Hereinafter cited 
as Bell, The Poli tic al Shame of Mexico. 
19Ibid. 
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to unseat the Madero government. In the ensuing battle, Bernardo 
Reyes was killed airl. General Villar was severely wounded. 20 General 
Ga. :vcf a Pena, Secretary of War in the Madero cabinet, persuaded the 
Mexican President to appoint Huerta as Villar's successar,21 an 
appointment Madero hesitated to make because he was disgusted with 
Huerta I s almost perpetual state of drunkenness ; ho-wever, with 
General Villar incapacitated, Madero was forced to accept Pena's 
advice because he had no other gererals. 
Huerta immediately betrayed Madero and entered into a secret 
agreement with F~lix Diaz whereby they would conduct a sham artillery 
duel from two batteries located in Mexico City. For ten days, 22 on 
the pretense of fighting each other, artillery shells fell in profu-
sion throughout the city. "The purpose of this wanton destruction 
was to create the picture of an irreconcilable civil war, of Madero's 
inability to end chaos, and to predispose the suffering public, ••• 
toward the solution which the generals would offer. 1123 Edward Bell, 
an ~rican correspondent in Mexico City at "1e tire of the battle, 
remarked: "Isolated guns were set up by apparently irresponsible 
20Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, ! History 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935)., p. 410. Hereinafter 
cited as Priestley, The Mexican Nation. 
21Gruening., Mexico, p. 304. 
22rn Mexican history., La Decena Trkica. 
23Gruening, Mexico, P• 305. 
• 
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squads, and fired over and over again in whatever position the 
pieces happened to asslllle after the recoil of the previous shot. 1t24 
Bell added that, 11 The affair was dishonest, root, branch and twig; 
dishonest as a squabble started by thieves in a crowd to draw atten-
tion from the picking of pockets. 1125 The wily Huerta, with 
Napoleonic cold-bloodedness, sent loyal federal troops into areas 
of the city on the pretense of assaulting Diaz, and then system-
atically slaughtered them with his own artillery. 26 
Apparently the cannonading was not entirely at random, for 
during the ten days the National Palace was struck only twice, and 
the American Embassy was never hit; yet both were often in direct 
line of fire. Ambassador Wilson, in opposition to his usual policy 
of reporting incidents of disorder, did not notify Washington that 
the Embassy or the .American colony was in any imminent danger. In 
fact, official Washington learned of the situation b,y a press release. 
In a telegram to Ambassador Wilson, Secretary of titate Knox said: 
"Associated Press reports that you were notified by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs that you should evacuate the Embas~ premises; that 
you positively decline to do so; and that the Minister • • • notified 
you that the firing must proceect. 1127 Ambassador Wilson replied that 
24Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, pp. 283-284. 
25Ibid., P• 281. 
26 Hudson Strode, Timeless Mexico (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
am Company, 1944), p. 234. 
27 Knox to Ambassador Wilson, (telegram), February 14, 1913. 
FR, 1913, PP• 708-709. 
-
ll 
the press release was correct, an:i that he had declined to leave the 
Embassy because he was in charge of United States government records 
and archives. He added that if the situation had become 11intolerable 11 
he would have removed all who wished to leave, but that outside the 
Embassy there was the threat of "bullets and bandits. 1128 The fact 
that Ambassador Wilson did not notify Washington of this dangerous 
situation, nor did he indicate wey he had declined to do so, suggests 
that no real danger to himself or the Embassy existed, despite the 
fact that an estimated four or five thousand Mexicans were killed 
during the battle. 
It seems apparent that collusion existed throughout the ten 
tragic days between Ambassador Wilson and the forces of Huerta and 
F~lix n:f.az. This concord is further supported by the infamous 
11Compact of the Embassy," drawn up on the night of Februru:y 18, 1913, 
in the American Embassy by Huerta and Filix D{az with Henry Lane 
Wilson 1s full knowledge. Later, that same night , Ambassador Wilson 
assembled the diplomatic corps of several nations in the United 
States Embassy and informed them that "Mexico had been saved! • • • 
I have known about the plans to imprison Madero for three days. It 
was slated to occur this morning•" 29 To the astoniS1ITB.nt, of the 
diplomats, he then announced the "exact composition of Huerta's 
28.Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 14, 1913. 
FR, 1913, PP• 709-710. 
29Gruening, Mexico, P• 568. 
12 
cabinet! 11 When asked about the disposition of Madero and Vice 
President Pino Sucirez, Ambassador Wilson replied that. Madero would 
probably be placed in a 11madhouse; 11 in regard to Sua'rez he said, 
11 ••• he is nothing but a scoundrel, so if they kill him it will 
be no great loss. 1130 The Chilean minister protested that every 
effort should be made to save the life of tm Mexican Vice President, 
but .Ambassador Wilson replied, "We nms t not meddle in the domestic 
affairs of Mexico. 1131 
He had allowed Huerta and Diaz to use the Anerican Embassy 
in organizing a revolutionary cabinet to succeed the legally consti-
tuted government to which he was accredited as an ambassador, he had 
fore-knowledge of the positions of that revolutionazy cabinet, but to 
intercede on behalf of Madero and Su.irez was 11meddling. 11 
On February 17, 1913, Ambassador Wilson wired the .AnErican 
State Departnmt that "Huerta notifies me to expect some action 
that will remove Madero from power at any moment ; plans fully 
matured, ••• I asked his messenger no questi ons and made no 
suggestions beyond requesting that no lives be taken except !?l, due 
30 
Ibid. 
31Ibid. A similar account implicating Henry Lane Wilson 
with both Huerta and Fe'lix Diaz mey be found in Priestley, The 
Mexican Nation, p. 41S. 
1111 
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process of law. 1132 On the following day, Madero and Suirez resigned 
and becama prisoners of Huerta, who was then faced with the problem 
of what to do with the ex-President and Vice President. At first he 
was opposed to killing them, not because of moral principles, but 
because of the consequences it might bring to his leadership. l"lany 
Mexicans clamored for the death of Madero, particularly the advocates 
of business who felt Madero would stir up another revolution if 
permitted to live.33 On February 19, Henry Lane Wilson spoke to 
Huerta about the death of Madero's brother, Gustavo Madero, who had 
been brutally tortured and murdered by Huerta I s soldiers. Huerta 
clained that Gustavo was killed without his orders. Their conversa-
tion then turned to the disposition of Francisco Madero: 11 He [Huert i} 
asked 11\Y advice as to whether it was best to send the ex-President 
out of the country or place him in a lunatic asylum. I replied that 
he ought to do that which was best for the peace of the country. 1134 
It is worthy of mention that no protest was registered by 
Ambassador Wilson for Gustavo Madero's deat, and that Huerta, 
schooled in Diaz principles of liquidating one's political opponents, 
could have interpreted the Anbassador' s words as license to commit 
32Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 17, 1913. 
FR, 1913, p. 718. Italics are mine. 
33Bell, The Poli tic al Shame of Mexico, p. 29.5. 
34Ambassador Wilson to Knox, (telegram), February 19, 1913. 
FR, 1913, p. 724. Italics are mine. 
-
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nrurder. Had Henry Lane Wilson suggested that Hua-ta spare Madero 1s life., 
he probably -would have accepted the advice., for he would have hesitated 
to incur opposition to his revolutionary goverI1I1Bnt. The United States 
Departmmt of State was apparently disturbed by Ambassador 'Wilson I s 
telegram., for Secretary Knox replied: 11 ••• General Huerta's 
consulting you as to the treatI1Ent of Madero tends to give you a 
certain responsibility in the matter. 1135 
On February 20., Madero's wife went to the American Embassy to 
plead with Herny Lane Wilson to intercede on behalf of her husband. 
The Ambassador refused to grant the sanctuary of the American 
Embassy to the Mexican officials, and said he had received assurances 
of Madero I s safety., but that the fate of Su.irez was not certain. Mrs. 
Madero, in an interview two years after her husband I s death., maintained 
that she gave Ambassador Wilson a message addressed to President Taft 
begging him to use his influence to save her husband's life.36 There 
is no evidence that Henry Lane Wilson ever r eceived or sent the 
message. 
On the night of February 22, while Madero and Sucirez were 
being transferred from the National Palace to a penitenti ary, they 
35Knox to Ambassador Wilson., (telegram) , February 20, 1913. 
FR., 1913, P• 725. 
36&11, The Political Shame of Mexico., PP• 313-314. 
-
15 
were both shot to death. It is not within the scope of this paper to 
examine the circumstances surrounding their deaths. Although most 
authorities agree that they were murdered by Huerta, .Ambassador Wilson 
conducted an investigation and stated that he was disposed to accept 
Huerta's explanation that the prisoners were shot while attempting 
to escape. In reply to assertions by the American press that Huerta 
was responsible for the deaths of Madero and SuArez, Ambassador 
Wilson said: 
History will undoubtedly straighten out this tangle, and 
while the crime was revolting to all people of ci viliz-ed and 
mimane sentiments it is not evident to 1TB that, • • • the 
death of these tliD Mexicans, ••• should arouse greater 
expressions of popular dis approval in the United States than 
the murders, unrequited by justice, of some 75 or 80 Americans 
in Mexico during the last two years. 37 
37Ambassador Wil son to Knox, (letter), March 12, 1913. 
FR, 1913, P• 772. 
CHAPTER II 
"WATCHFUL WAITING" AND WIL.50NIAN DIPLOMACY 
The organization of the Provisional. Government of Victoriano 
Huerta was effected on February 20, 1913.1 Ambassador Wilson's 
comments in reference to the deposed regime were: 11A Wioked despotism 
has fallen, but what tha future _ contains can not be safely predicted. 112 
The words 11wicked despotism" are indicative of Henry L~e Wilson's 
animosi-cy toward the ex-President; for Madero, although too idealistic 
to be competent, was certain not an autocrat. On the same dc\Y the 
Huerta government was organized, Ambassador Wilson sent the following 
dispatch to Washington: "The Department should innnediately instruct 
me as to the question of recognition of the Provisional Government, 
now installed and evidently in secure possession. 113 This request 
for instructions was the first episode of a diplomatic snarl that was 
to last for eighteen months. 
William Howard Taft, with less than +wo weeks of tenure remaining 
as President of the United States, hesitated to take action. According 
1Juubassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Philander 
c. Knox, (telegram), February 20, 1913. Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 724. A military 
interregnum existed from Februa.zy 18, 1913, to February 20, 1913. 
2Toid. 
3Ibid • ., P• 725. 
17 
to Professor Arthur Link, the refusal to grant inmediate recognition 
toHuerta by the United States Department of State was II not because 
of &\Y revulsion it felt against the means that Huerta had used to 
seize power, but because it desired to use recognition as a lever to 
obtain prompt settlement of a number of disputes outstanding with 
Mexico. 114 The desire to use recognition as a diplomatic tool, coupled 
with the shock felt by the American public for the murders of Madero 
and Suk-ez,. prompted the Taft administration to delay action. 5 
Woodrow Wilson's asswnption of the office of President of the 
United States on March 4, 1913, saw a marked departure from the 
traditional policy of recognition long adhered to by that country. 
To understand the extent to which this policy of recognition was 
epochal necessitates a brief presentation of the recognition policy 
of the United States, Wilson•s6 degree of departure from that policy, 
and a knowledge of his background that shaped this new departure. 
Thomas Jeff er son, writing to Thomas Pinckney in 1792, outlined 
what he considered to be the basic principles regarding recognition: 
We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle 
whereon our government is founded, that every nation has a 
4Arthur s. Link, Wilson, the ew Freedom (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), p.°J];8. 
5sa.muel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the 
United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace arxi Company, 1943), 
p. 174. Hereinafter cited as Bemis, Latin Aioorican Policy. 
6The name Wilson will refer to President Woodrow Wilson 
throughout this paper. 
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right to govern itself internally under what form it 
pleases, and to change these farms at its own will; 
and externally to transact business with other nati. ons 
through whatever organ it ehooses, ••• Tue only 
thing essential is, the will of tha nation. I 
The question of recognition was further elucidated by Henry Clay in 
1818: 
We have ••• constantly proceeded on the principle 
that the government de facto was that which we could 
alone notice. Whatever form of government any society 
of people adopt ; whoever they acknolwedge as their 
sovereign, we consider that government or that sovereign 
as the one to be acknowledged by us. We have invariably 
abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of the 
sovereign de jure, and against the sovereign de facto. 
That is a question for the nation in which it arises to 
determine ••• but ••• as soon as stability and order 
••• are maintained, ••• we •• 
8
• ougnt to consider 
the actual as the true government. 
Wi th minor deviations, such as an insistence that a new regine comply 
w.i. th international obligations and protect the lives of foreigners 
residing under its control, too recognition policy of the United 
States remained unaltered until 1913. Prior to this date, if the 
criteria for recognition as outlined by Jefferson and Clay were 
met by a government, recognition was a mere formality, and in no 
sense constituted approval or disapproval.9 
7secretary of btate Thomas Jefferson to Ambassador Thomas 
Pinckney, December JO, 1792. Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.), The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington: The Jefferson Memorial 
Association, 1904), Vol. IX, pp. 7-8. 
8Anna1s of the C0 ngress of the United States, 15 Congress, 
1 Session (Washington: Gales and Seaton, l~ p. 1488. 
9Howard F. C]_ine, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. i41. Hereinafter cited as 
Cline, United States and ~~xico. 
-
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Wilson added the principle of "constitutional legitimacy. n 
In other words, the United States would decide if the government 
of a sovereign nation had complied with its own constitution; and 
used this as a prerequisite of recognition, which not only amounted 
to intervention, but involved the concept of 11 good 11 and 1'bad11 revolu-
10 
tions. To determine the constitutional legitimacy of governments 
which are frequently changed by revolutions as they are in Latin 
America, would be a staggering job in itself. Add to this the 
fact that each new government is often based on a new constitution, 
which of course is written in a foreign language, and the task be-
comes overwhelming. The manifold dangers of injecting moral criterion 
into a nation's policy of recognition is illustrated by the words of 
Samuel F. Bemis: 11 At best the tasks and responsibilities of sitting 
in judgment on revolutio~ • extend to infinite gradations, 
degrees, circumstances, difficulties, diplomacies, and inconsist-
encies. That is why traditional policy has avoided tl'E danger of 
11 dogma in dealing with this problem. 11 
Wilson's new criteria for recognition can best be explained 
by an examination of his background and political thinking. By 
initiating the standards af constitutional legitamacy and 11 good 11 
revolutions, Wilson hoped to create stability in Latin-American 
10 . Ibid., p. 142. "Good" revolutions were supported by the 
will of the people; "bad11 revolutions were a coup d' ~tat or 
barracks revolt. 
11Bemis, Latin American Policy, p. 174. 
-
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nations, particularly those nations which were in a strategic posi-
tion with reference to the nearly completed Panama Canal. If he 
granted recognition to Huerta on the basis of a military coup, he 
felt certain it would trigger a series of bloody revolutions through-
out Latin America, and the United States would be obligated to 
recognize every government that possessed the strength to unseat 
another •12 However, the desire for stability only partially explains 
Wilsonian diplomacy. Wilson was a student of history and political 
science, but it is significant that his studies and teaching were 
confined to constitutional origins and representative self-government 
of Anglo-Saxon and German theory •13 He had al.most ignored "the 
peoples, poll tics, languages and cultures of Latin America. nl.4 In 
1902 he became President of Princeton University, a position he 
thoroughly enjoyed until his bitter fight of 1909 and 1910 with 
Dean Andrew F. West of the Princeton Graduate School. The contro-
versy was insignificant per~, but the f ~ct that Wilson lost control 
of the Graduate School apparently warped his personality and thinking. 
Defeat fostered a "proud and ueyielding stubbornness" and an inability 
12Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of -Woodrow 
Wilson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), PP• 222-223. 
Hereinafter cited as Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. 
13Bemis, Latin American Policy:, p. 168. 
14Ibid. 
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to work with anyone who opposed him.15 He was an idealist who whole-
heartedly advocated democracy, but paradoxically was a virtual. auto-
crat if his policies were opposed. Once he arrived at what he 
considered to be the proper course of action or policy, he seldom 
16 
changed his mind. Prior to his departure f or, Washington to be 
inaugurated as President he remar!'ed: "It would be the irony of 
fate if iey administration had to deal. chiefly with foreign affairs, 
.,17 . . . In his inaugural address he spoke of domestic affairs that 
had been a part of his platform and did not mention Mexico. The 
selection of his cabinet is indicative of his preoccupation With 
internal affairs; for pacifists William Jennings Bryan and Josephus 
Daniels were respectively chosen Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Navy, and Secretary of War Lindley Garrison was a ~aker.18 Profes-
sor Herbert Bell maintains that Bryan knew as little about foreign 
affairs as any American in public life.19 Both Bryan and Wilson were 
moralists who felt they had a mission to perform i n the world and 
thought of foreign policy in terms of "eternal. verities" rather than 
11 the expedient. 1120 Both felt that "they comprehended the peace 
15Arthur s. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 
1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 9. Here-
inafter cited as Link, Woodrow Wilson. 
16c11ne, United States and Mexico, p. 139. 
17 AB quoted in Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 81. 
18H. c. F. Bell, Woodrow Wilson arxi the People (Garden City: 
Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1945), pp~2-9J. 
19~ 
20Link, Woodrow Wilson, P• 81. 
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and well-being of other countries better than the leaders of those 
countries themselves.n21 
It is significant that the United States was emerging from 
a period of isolationism that had its beginning with the inception 
of that nation in 1789. Gross ignorance of foreign affairs was not 
peculiar to Wilson and Bryan, but it was their lot to be confronted 
with one of the most difficult problems their nation had faced since 
its Civil War. Their attempts to follow what has been termed 
"missionary diplomacy 11 led to intervention in the affairs of a 
sovereign nation on an unprecedented scale; but to have recognized 
Huerta, would have been entirely inconsistent w.ith their philosophy 
of right and wrong. 
Great Britain had no compunctions regarding the means by 
which Huerta had seized power, and formal recognition was extended 
on May 3, 1913, after it became apparent that Huerta was firmly 
installed as President and was capable of maintaining law, order, 
and stability. 22 By May 17, 1913, Germany, Italy, China, Spain, 
and Portugal had also extended recognition. 23 
In spite of obtaining recognition from several maj or powers 
the refusal of the United States to recognize Huerta's government 
21Ibid. 
22Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 250. 
23rbid. 
23 
unquestionably damaged his prestige and isolated him from financial 
support throughout the world. He could not obtain loans from the 
United States, and foreign bankers considered him a poor financial 
risk. This consideration was no doubt predicated on the sound basis 
that any Mexican President who incurred disfavor in the United States 
committed ultimate political suicide.24 Huerta was not unaware that 
he would have difficulty in maintaining control of Mexico if he 
failed to secure approval from tre Wilson administration. Petitions, 
sponsored by the Mexican President, Henry Lane Wilson, and independent 
businessmen, were circulated and signed by United States citizens in 
Mexico urging President Wilson to recognize the Huerta government. 25 
Their solicitations fell on 11 deaf ears, 11 for wnile Wilson had not 
formulated any positive policy with respect to Huerta; he doggedly 
refused to recognize him, insisting that he lTlllSt hold free elections. 
Huerta's unpopularity with the Wilson administration had served as an 
incentive for revolutionaries to organize and offer resistance to his 
government; the most powerful of whom wru:. Venustiano Carranza who, 
with a stroke of genius, named his forces the Constitutionalists. 
It is difficult to imagine a name more appealing to President Wilson. 
Huerta, beset by financial problems, frustrated by a friendly 
24see page S, Chapter I, of this paper. 
25Edward I. Bell, The Poli ti cal Shame of Mexico 
McBride, Nast and Comparv, 19i4), p. 342. Hereinafter 




Ambassador who represented a hostile nation, and faced with an 
increasing nwnber of revolutionary opponents26 was not an adversary 
to be discounted by Wilson. His strength lc\Y in support from Mexi-
can nationals who bitterly objected to the presumptuousness of the 
United States in telling them who could or could not be their 
President, concessionaires who hoped for a return of Porfirian 
treatment of foreign capital, and from alien residents who feared that 
if a "strong man" were not in control of Mexico, a repetition of the 
anarchial tragic ten days might occur. As Huerta gained confidence 
and support, he frequently leveled vituperative outbursts at Wilson. 
The latter's insistence that Mexico needed a democracy to cure its 
ills prompted Huerta to remark: 11What does Woodrow Wilson know of 
Mexico, or of what kind of government its people need? Nothing. He 
does not understand that Mexico is like a snake, with its life in its 
head. 11 27 A penetrating comparison of the two Presidents is presented 
by Edward Bell. "They were • •• strong and r esourceful men [who] 
had taken the highest seats in the two countries - strong in different 
ways, contrasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike 
in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality. 1128 
26Francisco "Pancho" Villa in the North and Emiliano 
Zapata in the South. 
27As quoted in Charles Morris, The Story of Mexico {9hicago: 
The John c. Winston Company, l9lh?] , p. 312. 
28Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico, P• 338. 
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Throughout the spring and summer of 1913, Ambassador Wilson 
tried desperately, .but ineffectually, to persuade Wilson that he 
should recognize the Huerta government. Considering Wilson's intol-
erance for anyone who opposed his policies, it is not unusual that 
he considered Ambassador Wilson untrustworthy; for the President and 
his Ambassador were diametrically opposed in regard to Mexico. Despite 
Wilson's distrust of Henry Lane Wilson and his prerogative of dismissing 
him, the Ambassador was left at his post until July of 1913; however, 
little of consequence was conducted through the diplomatic corps in 
Mexico City. Wilson's method of obtaining information was to appoint 
personal representatives who were sent to Mexico and reported 
directly to him. The first of these non-official emissaries, author 
and journalist John Bayard Hale, was appointed on April 9, 1913. 29 
This secret assignment was prompted by Wilson's increasing distrust 
of Ambassador Wilson and the need for information. Hale's report 
reached the American President in July of 1913, and stated that 
cordial relations existed between Henry Lane Wilson and Huerta, 
which were divergent with the administration's policy, and that the 
only way to avert American intervention was by election of a 
constitutional governrnent. 30 Hale further added that there was no 
doubt of Henry Lane Wilson's complicity in the Huerta coup of 
29Notter, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 248. 
JOLink, Woodrow Wilson, p. 112. 
-
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February· 18, 1913. It is not coincidental that Ambassador Wilson 
as relieved of his post immediately after Hale's final reports ~as 
in President Wilson's hands. 
In fairness to Henry Lane Wilson, the secret mission of Hale 
was a clear indication that the American State Department distrusted 
the reports it received from its Ambassador and regarded aey informa-
tion which was contrary to Hale I s as false. It is questionable that 
Hale who could not speak or read Spanish could have garnered reliable 
information; for he was compelled by tbe nature of his mission to use 
unofficial channels. 
The resignation of Henry Lane Wilson on August 4, 1913, left 
Wilson with a perplexing problem. If he appointed a new ambassador 
to Mexico it would be tantamount to recognition. If he did not, it 
would be difficult to bring any official pressure on Huerta or 
receive information from that country. The conundrum was inadequately 
approached by relegating diplomatic affairs to Chargci d'Affaires Nelson 
0 1Shaughnessy and appointing another personal emissary, Jolm Lind. 
Lind, like his predecessor, John Hale, "knew nothing of Mexico, Spanish, 
or diplomacy."32 He was a personal friend of Wilson, but his only 
experience in political affairs had been the Governorship of Minnesota. 
It is typical of Wilson's thinking to place more reliance in an 
inexperienced friend, than a career diplomat. The ex-Governor was 
32c11ne, United States and Mexico, p. 145. 
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given specific instructions by Wilson who piously maintained that 
he sincerely desired to uphold the "sovereignty and independence 
of Mexico . 1133 The incongruity of this statement is exemplified by 
Lind's instructions which stated that: 1. All hostilities in Hexico 
should end by a declared armistice, which would be observed by all 
factions. 2. A guarantee of early, free elections in which all 
parties would participate . 3. Victoriano Huerta Im1st agree not to 
be a candidate in the before-~&ntioned elections. 4. All parties 
must agree to abide by the results of the elections and pledge their 
. 34 cooperation. 
Frederico Gamboa, Foreign Minister of the Huerta Provisional 
Government, was furiously angry with Wilson's proposals. Gamboa's 
ire seems justified, for not only had the United States spurned 
diplomatic protocol by attempting to negotiate with a sovereign 
nation through an unofficial diplomat, but also demanded guarantees 
of a government which it refused to recognize. Gamboa at first 
rejected counsel with Lind, but later capitulated, although his 
irritation at the emissary's instructions was not diminished. He 
33James D. Hichardson, 
of the Presidents (New York: 
Vol . XVI, p. 7886. 
34Ibid. 
! Compilation of the Messages and Pa)ers 
Bureau of ~ational Literature, 1897, 
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agreed that it was within Huerta's power to declare an armistice, 
but how could the Mexican President guarantee that the various 
bandits in Mexico would comply with it? With superb eloquence 
he added that "Bandits ••• are not admitted to armistice; the 
first action against them is one of correction, and when this, 
unfortunately, fails, their lives must be severed for the sake of 
the biological and fundamental principle that the useful sprouts 
should grow and fructify. 1135 Gamboa pointedly stated that it was 
not necessary for Huerta to guarantee free and honest elections, 
because Mexican laws "provide such assurances.u36 With veiled 
cynicism, he said the request that Huerta not be a candidate ought 
not be considered, for it might possibly be construed as personal 
animosity toward the Mexican President.37 Finally; he insisted that 
Mexico could not allow the United States to influence affairs in 
Mexico or it would forego its sovereignty; because 11 all future 
elections for president would be submitted to the veto of any 
President of the United States of America. • 
18 
After replying to Lind I s instructions, Gamboa pleaded far 
recognition of the Huerta government. When Lind informed him that 
35Toid., p. 7892. 
36rbid., PP• 7892-7893. 
37Ibid., P• 7893. 
38 .As quoted in Link, Wood.row Wilson, P• 114. 
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Wilson would never agree, Gamboa asked that the United States 
abstain from interference in Me.xi.can affairs. Lind answered by 
delivering a "thinly veiled threat" that if Huerta rejected his 
proposals Wilson might ask Congress to revoke the Arms Embargo 
Act, thereby allowing the purchase of arms in the United States 
by the Constitutionalists.39 .As a final inducement Lind informed 
Gamboa that Wilson would ask United States banks to float adequate 
loans to Me.xi.co as soon as the conditions of his instructions were 
realized. Lo Gamboa was insulted by the offer of a bribe, and refused 
to consider it; however, his reaction was probably due to the 
manner in which it was unskillfully presented, rather than a 
matter of principles, for a bribe is an almost universal diplomatic 
tool. 
In view of the manner in which the Lind mission was conducted, 
the undiplomatic approach of Lind himself, and Gamboa's reaction to 
these proposals, it is difficult to underst and how it eould be con-
strued as successful in Washington, but such was the case. Perhaps 
Lind misquoted Gamboa in reporting to Wilson or exaggerated his 
accomplishments out of proportion, but nonetheless it ushered in 
the so-called "honeymoon" period from .August 27, 1913, to October 
39Ibid. 
4°samuel Flagg Bemis, The United States As !! World Power, 
A Diplomatic History, 1900-1955 (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1955), P• 76. 
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12, 1913. During this period virtually no mention was made of the 
Mexican problem. Marzy- Americans assumed that Huerta would resign, a 
new government would be elected in Mexico during October, and that 
the Mexican situation was one of peace and tranquility. An appraisal 
of the American public's concern for the Mexican problem was voiced 
by a British citizen visiting the United States: 11As a topic of public 
discussion, to judge from the columns of the .American Press, Mexico 
holds its own with the Tariff and Currency Bills, and is only eclipsed 
by the things that really matter - the golf championships, the opening 
of football season, and so on."41 On .August 27, 1913, Wilson delivered 
a speech wherein he expressed satisfaction w.i th the state of affairs in 
Mexico, this was aimed primarily at silencing Congressional criticism 
of his self-named "watchful waiting" policy.42 
Congressman Frank w. Mondell of Wyoming was one of many critics 
of the before-mentioned policy stating that "the new administration [ ha~ 
adopted an attitude which the President ••• referred to as one of 
•watchful waiting' • How watchful it was must remain a matter of 
opinion - that it was one of waiting cannot be disputed. 1143 Mondell 
added that the primary concern of the United States policy in Mexico 
41sydney Brooks, "A British View of the Mexican Problem II North 
.American Review, CXCVIII (October, 1913), P• 455. 
42cune, United States and Mexico, P• 146. 
43Frank w. Mondell, "The Duty of tre United States Toward Mexico," 
The Annals: International Relations of the United States, LIV (July, 
1914), P• 176. - - --
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should be to protect the lives and investments of its citizens. This 
could best be accomplished, he argued, by recognizing the government 
which controlled most of Mexico44 and by using international law 
rather than pursuing non-recognition, which had actively stimulated 
revolutionaries and t hus jeopardized United States citizens by 
furthering anarchial conditions.45 
From the floor of the United States Senate came the most 
caustic attacks on Wilson's Mexican policy. Senator Albert B. Fall 
of New Mexico, whose connections with business interests are well-
known, presented himself as spokesman for the states adjacent to 
Mexico, which were inimical to Huerta. By interviews and speeches he 
sought to arouse American sentiment to the point of intervention, for 
most American companies would have preferred Mexico to be occupied 
by United ~tates forces. In a resolution placed before the Senate, 
Fall advocated universal protection of American lives and capital: 
Resolved, That the constitutional rights of .American 
citizens should protect them on our borders, and go with 
them throughout the world, and every American citizen 
residing or having property in any foreign country is 
entitled to and must be given the full protection of the 
United Stt~es Government, both for himself and his 
property. 
44At this time, Huerta controlled twenty-two of the twenty-
seven political areas of Mexico. 
45Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
46congressional Record, 63 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, J.913), p. 2658. Italics, 
with the exception of Resolved, are mine. 
FORSYTH LIBRARY 
FORT HAYS KANSAS STATE COLLEGE 
32 
When Wilson asked Congress to appropriate one hundred thousand dollars 
to defray the expenses of Americans who wished to leave Mexico, Senator 
Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania argued that "Rather than appropriate t:00 
pittance of $100,000 to make this woolesale removal I would urge the 
spending of $25,000,000 to keep them where they belong and protect them 
in their legal occupations."47 Following this suggestion, Penrose 
introduced Senate Resolution #167 which stated that President Wilson 
should be asked to send "a sufficient number" of constabulary troops 
to Mexico for the purpose of policing and protecting American lives 
and property, and that this action should not be regarded as one of 
"hostility or unfriendliness toward the Mexican nation."48 Senator 
Knute Nelson of Minnesota protested that intervention in a sovereign 
state meant war, and that Mexico should be permitted to settle her own 
internal problems, as the United States had done during its Civil War; 
but Penrose was unabashed and replied that 11'We have been for a 
generation going down to Nicaragua and to other Central and South 
American Republics and landing marines to protect American lives and 
American property. So I do not think that I am proposing anything 
radical.1149 The Penrose Resolution serves to illustrate an erroneous 
47Ibid., P• 3568. 
4Bibid. 
49Ibid., P• 3569. 
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conclusion on too part of those who favored intervention that Mexico 
would be equated in strength With Cuba, Santo Domingo, or Panama. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, was also critical of 
Wilsonian diplomacy, which he maintained had placed the lives and 
property of American citizens in jeopardy. He argued that it was 
an ignominious situation when United States ministers had to ask 
foreign ambassadors in Mexico to protect American citizens, because 
the American ministers "were not backed up at home.tt50 It is 
significant that criticism stemmed primarily from Republicans and 
advocates of American business interests in Mexico; but Wilsonian 
"watchful waiting" was also attacked on a more objective basis by poli-
tical thinkers of that time, one of whom was Professor L. S. Rowe. 
Rowe warned that unless the United States adopted and pu.raued a con-
structive policy toward Mexico, that conditions of anarchy within 
that country wuld increase to a point that would necessitate armed 
intervention by the United States, whetoor i t wished to or not. 51 
He added that the rudiments of a positive policy which had b~ 
invoked were used to prevent European powers from taking action in 
Mexico and that this was based on the negative approach of the Monroe 
SOibid., P• 2598. 
51L. s. Rowe, "The Scope and Limits of Our Obligations Toward 
Mexico," The Annals: International Relations of the United States, 
LIV (July, 1914), P• 2)4. 
Doctrine rather than an admission that Mexico was important to 
the United States.52 
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52rbid., pp. 219-2220. Rowe maintained that the acquisition 
of the Panama Canal forced the United States to become a Central 
American, as well as North American, power. 
CHAPTER III 
DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION 
The tranquility of the 11honeymoon 11 period was shattered on 
October 10, 1913, when Victoriano Huerta imprisoned one-hundred and 
ten members of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and declared a mil-
l itary dictatorship. This action was in exact coincidence with the 
appointment of Sir Lionel Carden as British Foreign Minister to 
Mexico. Carden was "the mouthpiece" of British oil magnate Lord 
Weetman Cowdray who had huge investments in Mexican oil. Wilson 
suspected that CowdrcV influenced the Mexican policy of the British 
Foreign Office and that the appointment of Carden had given Huerta 
assurance that he could count on British support. His suspicions 
were based on what he thought to be sound premises. 
From 1911 to 1913 Carden was British Foreign Minister to Cuba. 
He was so decidedly anti-American that Secretary of State Knox had 
brought his behavior to the attention of the British Foreign Office. 
Great Britain's reaction was characteristic of her support for a 
public servant who becomes unpopular with a foreign power. Carden 
was not only permitted to remain in Cuba, but knighted, too! 3 Lord 
1917 
cited 
1Arthur s. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 195L.;,pp. 116-117, Hereinafter 
as Link, Woodrow Wilson. 
2 Ibid., P• 116. 
3Ambassador Wal.ter H. Page to Edward M. House, (memorandum), 
August 25, 1913. Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter!!• 
(Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922), Vol. I, PP• 196-
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Cowdray controlled 1,600,000 acres of Mexican land, half of which he 
owned and the remainder obtained by thirty-year leases. His largest 
well, Dos Bocas, flowed 103,000 barrels of oil every twenty-four 
hours. In 1912 Great Britain had converted her coal-burning ships to 
oil, and the following year Cowdray signed a contract to supply 
7,200,000 barrels of fuel per year. 4 It is significant that at this 
time Mexico was virtually Great Britain's only source of petroleum 
am that the appointment of Carden as Minister 1D Mexico followed 
Cowdray 1s contract with the British government. Huerta's boldness 
in declaring himself dictator was not based entirely on British 
support, however, nor was the dismissal of one-hundred and ten 
members of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies a random action for not 
one member of the Catholic Party was expelled. If his financial 
problems became more acute, Huerta shrewdly counted upon support 
from the Catholic Church arrl the Hacendados. He knew that Wilson 
and his cabinet were opposed to armed intervention in Mexico. The 
disinclination to use force was strengthened by the fact that those 
who advocated its use were members of the opposition party, aid t hat 
Wil son had campaigned on a platform protesting t he dominance of 
"Wall Street" in American politics. Furthermore, the demands of 
the Lind Mission were based on no effective means of enforcing them, 
4Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New York: 
McBride, . Nast and Compaey719l4), PP• 347-348. 
• 
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and thus were nothing more than a diplomatic "bluff. 11 Once a nation 
pursues what it purports to be an adamant diplomatic policy, which it 
can not carry to its fulfillment, that policy loses its effectiveness, 
and must be supplanted by one less stringent in its demands, or a 
more severe approach backed by stronger measures. Since Wilson was 
deterlllined that "Huerta had to go,"' it was his task to find these 
"stronger measures. 11 His approach was two-pronged: first, to 
alienate Huerta from British support; and second, to use the Consti-
tutionalist forces to implement the demise of Huerta as President of 
Mexico. 
Although there had been disagreements, Anglo-Anerican relations 
had been cordial from 1894 to 191). The boundary dispute of 1894-
1895 between Venezuela and Great Britain had aroused hostilities 
between Britain and the United States. Grover Cleveland asserted 
the right of the United States to arbitrate the matter on the basis 
of the often referred to, but seldom used, Monroe Doctrine. Fortunatezy, 
Britain chose not to enforce her claims, for she saw the inadequacy of 
her policy of "splendid isolation," and the Kruger telegram pointed out 
the danger of Germany on her flank.5 Mi.nor points of contention again 
occurred in Venezuela ani Alaska during President Theodore Roosevelt's 
'Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American 48ople (fifth edition; New York:- Appleton-Century-Crofts,1955), P• 9. 
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first term, but the revocation of the Cla;yton-Bulwer Treaty and 
the provisions of the second H.v-Pauncefote Treaty in November 
of 1901, had shown that Great Britain was content to recognize the 
supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean. This new regard 
was based on the emergence of the United States as a world power 
and the efforts of Theodore Roosevelt to build an effective navy. 
Despite increasing regard for the United States, Wilson's Mexican 
policy prompted a British observer to remark tmt it was a mass of 
"puerile inconsistencies" whereby tre United States would not intervene; 
would not allow anyone else to do so; refused to recognize Huerta; 
disputed his authority, but held him responsible for •rican lives 
and property. The Englishman further stated that ·Wilson depicted 
Mexico as a nation beset by anarcey and civil war, but advocated a 
democracy to cure its ills.6 
With this mingled background of cordiality and criticism, 
Wilson began the pursuance of his first objective, which manifested 
itself in a memorandum intended for circulation among maj or foreign 
powers, to the effect that Huerta could not exist without foreign 
support and recognition, which had been extended by foreign powers 
on purely economic motives. He added that unless recognition was 
withdrawn, and the United States allowed a 11free hand11 in Mexico, 
he would have to use force to obtain desired objectives in that 
6sydney Brooks, "A British View of the Mexican Problem," 
North American Review, CXCVIII (October, 1913), P• 455. 
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7 country. The memorandum was given to Professor John Bassett 
Moore, who was to re-write it in diplomatic jargon. Moore, how-
ever, refused to do so and gave Wilson an unforgettable lesson in 
international propriety. In substance, he told Wilson that foreign 
powers did not have to ask the approval of the United 5tates to 
recognize anyone; that in view of its own record in Mexico the 
United States had no right to criticize foreign motives; and that 
the United States had not kept its agreement with Britain by the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901.8 Wilson chose not to issue the 
memorandum, and entered into diplomatic discussions with Sir William 
Tyrrell of Great Britain. 
Tyrrell, a substitute for the ailing Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, 
was sent to the United States by the British Foreign Office to 
discuss, unofficially, .Anglo-American relations. According to 
Charles Seymour, "No on understood better G,han Tyrrel'.g the ins 
or outs of Continental politics or r f>al ized more acutely how great 
an asset to the British American sympathy might become in case of 
trouble in Europe. 119 Tyrrell was also an affable person with a sharp 
7Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953),pp. 14B-14~Hereinafter cited as 
Cline, United States and Mexico. 
Bibid., p. 150. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty provided that ships of 
all nati~should be treated equally with respect to Panama Canal rates . 
In 1912 Congress passed an act which eliminated canal tolls on United 
States coast to coast shipping. 
9 Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), Vol. I, P• 198. Hereinafter 
cited as Seymour, Intimate Papers. 
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sense of humor, which was displayed when Secretary of State 
Bryan remarked that oil interests were dictating the Mexican 
policy of the British Cabinet. Tyrrell replied: "Lord Cowdray 
hasn't money enough. Through a long experience with corruption 
the Cabinet has grown. so greedy that Cowdray hasn't the money 
necessary to reach their price. 1110 Bryan, always eager to criticize 
11big business," unwittingly regarded this as an admission of corrup-
tion in the British government. The informal conversations between 
Lord Tyrrell and Wilson were of short duration as it became apparent 
that once British property and British lives were safeguarded, 
Wilson could handle Mexico in his own way. Simultaneous with the 
conversations between Wilson and Lord Tyrrell, Alrerican Ambassador 
to Great Britain, Walter H. Page, was working toward the same goal 
namely, the withdrawal of support and recognition of Huerta. The 
negotiations, as reported by Page, between himself and British 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, reflect the attitude of Great 




They are slow to see what good will come of 
Huerta unless we know beforehand who will succeed 
• they have a mania for order, sheer order, order 
sake of order. They can't see how anything can 
lOAs quoted in Burton J. Hendrick, Life~ Letters of Walter 
~- Page, p. 203. 
come in any one I s [ anyone I fil thought before order or how 
anything need come afterward ••• I assure you they don't 
think beyond order. A nigger lynched in Mississippi offends 
them more than a tyrant in Mexico.11 
Page added that the question of the Panama Canal tolls should be 
removed as it would incalcuably rei..ruforce the bargaining position of 
the United States.12 It is not known what promises Wilson made to 
Great Britain beyolliusing his influence to protect their concessions 
in Mexico; but Lord Grey a;greed to withdraw recognition of Huerta, 
and silenced Sir Lionel Carden by informing him that he was in no way 
to interfere with Wilson's anti-Huerta polity in Mexico.13 British 
statesmen do not often make bad bargains, and it is inconceivable that 
Grey believed Wilson, who was still opposed to armed intervention by 
United States forces, could offer real security to British lives and 
investments in Mexico; but in the words of Arthur S. Link: 
However doubtful Grey might have been about the President's 
ability to keep these promises, in the then perilous state of 
European affairs he had no alternative but to co-operate. In 
the event of a general European war, which seemed in the ufing, 
American friendship would be wor vn more than Mexican oil. 
Evidence, based on Page 1s report that Great Britain considered the 
J.lPage to President Woodrow Wilson, (letter), November 16, 1913. 
Hendrick, Life and Letters of Walter.!!• Page, PP• 185-189. 
12 Page to House, (letter), November 2, 1913. Hendrick, Life 
Letters of Walter .!!• Page, p. 190. 
13seymour, Intimate Papers, p. 202. 
1½.ink, Woodrow Wilson, PP• 119-120. 
-
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Treaty of 1901 to be violated, suggests that Wilson made a gentle-
man's agreement to ask Congress to repeal the Canal Toll ~xemption 
Act. Wilson sought repeal for this act in an address delivered to 
Congress on March 5, 1914. 11 I ask this of you in support of the 
foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal 
with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence 
if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure. 1115 According to 
Colonel House, "The. matter of 'greater delicacy' was the 
elimination of Huerta and the understanding with Great Britain. 1116 
Having alienated Huerta from British support, Wilson now 
proposed to implement the second phase of his positive policy by 
supporting Huerta's enemies. Again he called his two personal 
emissaries, John Lind and John BB3"ard Hale. Lind informed Wilson 
that an effective means of ousting Huerta would be to promote civil 
war in Mexico by throwing the support of the United States behind 
the Constitutionalists, and blockading Me"'d.can ports with American 
1 ~ 
warships. f If this did not bring the desired result, armed interven-
tion would be necessary. The extent to which Wilson followed Lind's 
suggestions is shown by his subsequent actions and a telegram from 
Secretary of State Bryan to Charg~ d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy, 
15congressional Record, 63 Congress, 2 Session (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1914), P• 4313. 
16 Seymour, Intimate Papers, p. 205. 
l 7 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Port? of the United 
States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19 3, P• 177. 
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wherein O'Shaughnessy was told that usurpers such as Huerta could 
not be tolerated, and that he must be forced out by isolating him 
from all foreign aid and eympathy; however, if this was not effective 
11 less peaceful means" would be used "to put him out. tt,lB John Hale 
was sent to Nogales, Mexico, in mid-.ovember of 1913 to confer with 
the Constitutionalist commander, Venustiano Carranza. Wilson's 
proposal, as presented by Hale, was that in return for United States 
support of the Constitutionalist forces, Carranza would guarantee 
free elections in Mexico. Carranza flatly refused to make such a 
compact and informed Hale that he himself would fight any United 
States troops on Mexican soil, and that the only thing he desired 
from the United States was "recognition of their belligerent status, 
with the accompanying privilege of buying arms and ammunition. 1119 
Wilson doubtless considered Carranza an ingrate of the highest 
caliber, for he was willing to throw the force of the United States, 
short of milita.r,y troops, behind Carranza, asking only that the 
Mexican leader guarantee free elections. Carranza I s refusal to 
cooperate was not predicated entirely on stubbornness or the 
inalienable right of Mexicans to settle their internal affairs, 
18secretary of State William J. Bryan to ChargJ O'Shaughnessy, 
(telegram), November 24, 1913. P,ers Relating to the Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, 1914 Washington: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1919),~443. Hereinafter cited as FR. 
19Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 121. 
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but was based on the sound precedent that any Mexican President 
who had known dealings with the 11 Colossus of the North" found 
his government tainted with suspicion and beset by revolutionary 
opposition.20 Don Roberto V. Pesqueira, a confidential agent of 
Carranza in the United States, remarked that the United States was 
more interested in restoring dollar dividends than peace in Mexico. 21 
This abject refusal on the part of the Constitutionalists to cooperate 
gradually moved Wilson's thinking toward an acceptance that civil war 
in Mexico was essential to meet the unique problems of that state. 
This s3-pproach was advocated by Professor Leslie c. Wells, who main-
tained that it was inconceivable that a government openly supported 
• by foreigners would be free of a president and congress not slanted 
toward foreign nationalities. This government would lack the support 
of the people arrl the result would be another revolution.22 Wells 
added that Americans were completely unqualified to handle the 
Mexican land problem, for the idea of confiscating land to divide 
it among the peasants would be an abhorence to a nation imbued with 
2°Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 151. 
21non Roberto v. Pesqueira, 11The Constitutionalist Party in 
Mexico: What It Is Fighting For," The Annals: International 
Relations of the United States, LIV (July, 1914), P• 173. 
22Leslie c. Wells, "The Remedy for Mexico," The Annals: 
International Relations of the United States, LIV (July, 1914), 
p. 218. - -
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the concept of the right of private ownership. 23 
Wilson's changing attitude was possibly influenced by Luis 
Cabrera, whom Carranza sent to Washington for the express purpose 
of explaining the agrarian problems of Mexico. Cabrera insisted 
that the revolutions in Mexico were socio-economic, and that 
democracy could not exist until the power of the huge land owners 
was broken. 24 Professor L. S. Rowe argued that while tyrannical 
government is not necessarily good, the Indians and peones suffered 
more under a weak central government, due to corrupt local officials. 25 
Whether Wilson was influenced by Cabrera, the refusal of Carranza to 
cooperate, or the logical arguioonts of Professors Wells and Rowe is 
of minor significance. It is important that by the latter part of 
January, 1914, he was not only concerned with the removal of Huerta, 
but also the manner by which it was to be accomplished. This is 
evident in Secretary of State Bryan's reply to a proposal by Sir 
Edward Grey which stated that Great Britain and other European 
governmants might agree to draft a request for Huerta's resigna-
tion, if Woodrow Wilson could present a plan for the pacification 
23Ibid. , p. 217. 
24c1ine, United States and Mexico, P• 154. This meeting 
of Wilson and Cabrera occurred in early January of 1914. 
251. s. Rowe, "The Scope and Limits of Our Obligations 
Toward Mexico," The Annals: International Relations of 
United States, LIV(July, 1914), P• 227. 
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of Mexico after Huerta's removal. The British Foreign Secretary said 
that Huerta might accept the request if presented by several powers 
instead of just the United States; because he could "save his face" 
and Mexico would not be submitting to another single independent 
state. 26 Bryan replied that the United States had made "several 
earnest efforts" to effect a change of government in Mexico, which 
Huerta would not accept; and if Huerta resigned he would be replaced 
by one of his associates, which would not bring peace to Mexico 
because it would not satisfy the Constitutionalists in the North. 
Bryan added: It . the United States has received information 
which convinces it that there is a more hopeful prospect of peace, 
if Mexico is left to the forces now reckoning with one an-
other there ••• Settlement by civil war carried to its bitter 
2~ 
conclusion is a terrible thing, but it 11IUSt come now." f Bryan 
informed Ambassador Page that after careful study, President 
Wilson had decided to abandon a policy of isolation aro. that he 
would lift the arms embargo restriction. 28 
It is interesting to note that Bryan and Wilson felt 
26 Page to Bryan, (telegram), January 28, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 444. 
27Bryan to Page, (telegram), January 29, 1914. FR. 1914, 
P• 445-446. 
28Toid., P• 445. 
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~ustified in stating what the Constitutionalists would or would not 
accept, and that the reply to the British proposal was drafted after 
one dqy of consideration. During the previously-mentioned Congressional 
criticism of Wilson's Mexican policy, Senator William Alden Smith from 
Michigan disclosed that "there is at the present moment in this Capital 
a thorough, practical, systematic lobby, putting forth their revolu-
tionary propaganda with a serious and a definite object [ objectiv~ 
of affecting the American attitude toward the Governroont of Mexico, 
• st29 Senator Smith named a Mr. Hopkins and a Mr. Sorranerfield as 
two members of this lobby. The words "revolutionary propaganda" 
would seem to indicate a Constitutionalist pressure group, and it 
is doubtful that representatives of Huerta would have been cordially 
received in Washington. Evidence points toward close contact between 
the forces of Carranza and the United States, although Carranza did 
not obligate himself with any agreement as to how he would conduct 
Mexican affairs if he succeeded Huerta. 
On February 3, 1914, Woodrow Wilson revoked the Arms Embargo 
Proclamation of March 14, 1912, which had been issued due to condi-
tions of "domestic violence II in Mexico. Wilson I s justification for 
lifting the embargo was that conditions which caused the issuance 
of the 191~ proclamation 11 have essentially changed, 11 and he wished 
29congressional Record, 63 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1913), P• 3213. Here-
inafter cited as Congressional Record. 
to attain a similar position with other nations in respect to 
exporting arms to Mexico. 30 The extent to which Wilson had 
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departed from a policy of isolation is apparent by comparing his 
above statements with one issued on .August 27, 191): "I shall 
follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality 
by forbidding the exportation of arms or nmnitions of war from the 
United States to any part of the Republic of Mexico ••• n31 
The Constitutionalist reaction to the opportunity of procuring 
weapons in the United States was instantaneous. Military stocks 
in El Paso, Texas, were depleted by demands from Jufu-ez, Mexico, 
United States border guards released captured snru.gglers and their 
contraband, and huge shipments of arms and munitions were transported 
from New Orleans to Matamoros.32 The Constitutionalists felt that 
Huerta would easily collapse before their newly acquired weapons; 
but in reality the repeal of the arms embargo strengthened the 
Mexican dictator, for the landed aristocracy, the Catholic Church, 
and business concerns rallied themselves for the first time to 
his support. In a final effort to bring Huerta to his knees, 
JOProclamation Revoking the Proclamation of March 14, 1912, 
Prohibitin the Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War to 
Mexico, ebruary 3, 19iL J FR, 19ll, PP• 4L7-448. 
Jlcongressional Record, p. )804. 
32charles Morris, The Slory of Mexico @hicago: The John c. • 
Winston Company, 1914'[1 , P• 31 • 
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Wilson ordered a naval blockade of Mexican ports. 33 This action 
precipitated an incident tha:t led to armed intervention by United 
States forces. 
33sa.muel Flagg Bemis, The United S~ As~ World Power, 
A Diplomatic History, 1900-1955 (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1955), P• 77. 
CHAPTER IV 
MILITARY INTERVENTION 
A special cable dated April 9, 1914, to The New York Times 
stated that the Mexican port of Tampico was under seige by the 
Constitutionalist forces and that capture of the city by the rebels 
was imminent. 1 However, Re~ Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commanding 
officer of the U.S. S. Dolphin, which was anchored outside Tampico 
harbor, reported that the port city was adequately defended by the 
Federal gun-boats Vera Cruz and Zaragoza, but that the Aguila Oil 
Company's refinery (owned by Lord Cowdray) and the Waters-Pierce 
refinery ( an American company) were completely destroyed by shelling. 
According to The New York Times, the American company made vigorous 
protests to the United States Department of State.2 On the same day 
that Admiral Mayo's communique described the destruction occurring at 
Tampico, a whale boat from the Dolphin with a United States Paymaster 
and seven enlisted men aboard docked near Iturbide Bridge in Tampico 
harbor to purchase gasoline. The gasoline was procured and during 
the loading of it a Mexican colonel, Ram6n H. Hinojosa, arrested the 
1 The New York Times, April 10, 1914, p. 1. Hereinafter cited 
as NYT. - - -- ---
2Ibid. Diplomatic correspondence from January 31, 1914, to 
April 9,19iI, is not contained in Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1914. 
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eight Americans, two of whom were in the whale boat which was flying 
the flag of the United States.3 Colonel Hinojosa marched the ar-
rested men t hrough the streets of Tampico and reported to the command-
ing general of the Federal forces, General Ignacio Zaragoza. Zaragoza 
iilU'llediately released the men, arrested Hinojosa, and sent a verbal 
apology to Admiral Mczy-o stating that the port was under martial law 
because of attacking rebels. He added that Colonel Hinojosa had 
arrested the Americans due to ignorance, but in compliance th the 
necessities of martial law. To Admiral Mayo, who considered the 
affair an insult to the American flag, the apology was not sufficient 
reparation. He delivered a twenty-four hour ultimatum, without author-
ization from Washington, demaniing "formal disavowal" for the arrest, 
General Zaragoza's assurance that Hinojosa be severely punished, and a 
twenty-one gun salute to be given to the Anerican flag hoisted on 
Mexican soil. 4 
The incident was regarded in United States diplomatic circles as 
resulting from errors in judgment on the part of Colonel Hinojosa in 
making the arrest and the paymaster's decision to land where he did. 
3Admiral Henry T. Mayo to General Ignacio M. Zaragoza, (letter), 
April 9, 1914. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1914 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1922), p-:-Jili8. Hereinafter cited as FR. 
4Ibid., pp. 448•449. The salute was to be returned by the 
Dolphin.--
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Nelson O'Shaughnessy, American Charg~ d'Affaires in Mexico City, 
reported that Huerta took the incident lightly, 11unhesitatingzy 
agreed to reparation, 11 and promised an investigation and punish-
ment of Hinojosa if found guilty. O'Shaughnessy stated that in 
view of the fact that the whale boat displayed the Am:lrican flag, 
an investigation by the United States would also be forthcoming.5 
On April 10, 1914, the context of Admiral Mayo's ultimatum was sent 
to vacationing President Wilson with a note attached by Secretary of 
State Bryan stating that he didn 1t see how "Mayo could have done other-
wise.116 Wilson was in accord w.ith the view of his Secretary of State 
and decided to support Admiral Mayo's demands; however, Mayo's actions 
were not condoned by Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels. Daniels main-
tained that the Admiral. could have easily reached Washington by wire-
less or telegraph, but had declined to do so before issuing his orders. 
Daniels added that he was almost al one in the State and Navy Depart-
ments in feeling that Mayo should have accepted Zaragoza1s apology, 
and that Wilson and the rest of his cabinet felt that Mayo was pre-
mature in delivering the ultimatum, but decided to back him because 
failure to do so would "hearten Huerta. 117 
5NYT, April 11, 1914, PP• 1-2. 
6secretary of State William J. Bryan to ~resident Woodrow Wilson, 
(telegram), April 10, 1914. FR, 1914, p. 449. 
7Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace - 1910-1917 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Tress, 1946), PP• 
188-191. Hereinafter cited as Daniels, The Wilson Era. 
53 
On April 11, 1914, Bryan informed 0 1Shaughnessy that the 
reparations agreed to by Huerta had not included compliance with 
Admiral Mayo's demand for a salute to the American flag, c11d that 
nothing short of this would be accepted by the United States govern-
8 
ment. Because Mexican governmental. functions were virtually paralyzed 
by the observance of Holy Week, compliance with the ultimatum was first 
extended twenty-four hours and later postponed until April 19. The 
intervening eight days between April 11 and April 19 were filled with 
diplomatic correspondence, proposals and counterproposals, accusations 
and renriminations. The uncompromising attitude of the United States 
is illustrated by an article in The New York Times. "However mild the 
course of the administration in Qiandlin~ previous incidents in Mexico 
• it is maintaining a stiff backbone that shows no sign of bending, 
and it is supporting to the utmost Admiral Mayo's demands. 119 
The Huerta government was at first equally adamant, maintaining 
tl::a.t the men from the Dolphin had lanned without permission in a port 
where ma;rt'ial law was declared, and that their immediate release plus 
an apology to Admiral Mayo was sufficient reparation. It refused to 
honor the American admiral's demands for a salute on the basis of 
8secretary of State William J. Bryan to Charg~ d'Affaires 
Nelson 0 1Shaughnessy, (telegram), April 11, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 452. 
9NYT, April 13, 1914, P• 1. 
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international law and because compliance would entail an acceptance 
of the sovereignt~ of a foreign state.10 On what basis of inter-
national law the Mexican refusal was predicated was not made clear; 
but after consulting Professor John Bassett Moore, the United States 
Depart:roont of State declared that the arrest of tre two men in the 
whale boat was a flagrant violation of international law, for public 
vessels carry the element of extraterritoriality and men abroad them 
are as imnnme to arrest as an ambassador within his embassy. It 
seemingly was a question of whether the exigencies of martial law 
outweighed the rights of extraterritoriality, but according to 
Professor Arthur Link, 11the affair would have ended with Zaragoza's 
apology had not the Washington administration been looking for an 
11 excuse to provoke a fight.•• Professor Link's observation seems 
justified in view of two minor incidents which were exaggerated out 
of proportion, and which tipped the balance for Congressional approval 
of military intervention. On April 12, 1914, a :roossage from the 
American State Department to O 'Shaughnessy was detained by a Mexican 
telegraph operator who was employed as a replacement for the regular 
operator during Holy Week. Through inexperience and ignorance, as 
100 1Shaughnessy to Bryan, (telegram), April 12, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 455. 
11Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-
1917 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954)~. 122. 
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verified by O'Shaughnessy, the replacement thought that the message 
should be translated before delivering it to tre American Charg~.12 
The incident was reported in The New York Ti.mes as evidence that 
United States and Mexican relations had been 11brought to a head. 1113 
Three days later, a naval orderly from the U .s .S. Minnesota and a 
Mexican mail orderly attempted to carry on a conversation outside a 
post office at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Neither was able to speak both 
English and Spanish and in an at tempt to understand each other began 
shouting. A Mexican policeman, fearing a disturbance, escorted both 
men to a police station where a judge immediately released the Ameri-
can, while the Mexican was detained and given "proper punishment." 
Admiral Frank F. F1etcher, commanier of the Americcn fleet in Mexican 
waters, said: "The attitude of the Mexican authorities wa::; correct; 
there is not cause for complaint against them and the incident is with-
out significance. 1114 Nevertheless, this was released to the .American 
press under the caption 11U. S. Mail Orderly Thrown in Jaill 1115 
Meanwhile, Huerta had altered his stand on the salute. His 
proposal, as outlined to 0 1Shaughnessy, was for the United States to 
12o'Shaughnessy to Bryan, (telegram), April 12, 1914. FR, 1914, 
PP• 453-454. 
l)NYT, .April 13, 1914, P• 1. 
l4Adroiral Frank F. Fletcher to Secretary of Navy Josephus 
Daniels, (telegram), April 16, 1914. FR, 1914, P• 465. 
l5NYT, April 17, 1914, P• 1. 
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salute simultaneously the Mexican flag as Mexico saluted the American 
flag. Bryan curtly stated that 11 a simultaneous salute would deprive 
his (}iuerta•i} action of its significance. 1116 After this rebuff, Huerta 
agreed to a draft protocol drawn up by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Josi L6pez Portillo y Rojas, and Charge O'Shaughnessy, wherein Merico 
agreed to deliver a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag asking 
only that the United States immediatel,y return the salute. 0 1Shaughnessy, 
stressing the urgency of settling the matter, sent the text of the 
protocol to Washington and asked if he should sign it; Bryan replied 
that Wilson was 11 out of town" and could not be reached until the next 
morning; however, Bryan added, 11 [ I] am sure ••• that he would not 
be willing to have you sign the protocol mentioned. The salute should 
be fired without aI\V" agreement as to the return salute. 1117 The Secretary 
said that the United States could be relied upon to fulfill international 
"custom arrl courtesy," and continued: "In addition to other reasons, 
signing of the protocol would be objectionable because it might be 
construed as recognition of his [ Huert a•~ Government whereas the 
President has no intention of recognizing the Huerta Government. 1118 
Portilla y Rojas, upon receiving Bryan's answer to the protocol, 
bitterly remarked that the United States desired to humiliate the 
16Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, (telegram), April 17, 1914. FR, 1914, 
p. 466. 
l7~., April 19, 1914, P• 471. 
18f!?g. 
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Provisional Government of Mexico by demanding a salute without a 
guaranteed return salute, and asked "Wh8" the United States bothered 
to demand reparation from a goverruoont which it did not recognize 
as being in existence. After brief consultation with Huerta, 
Portilla y Rojas announced that Mexico would not unconditionally 
19 
deliver the salute. 
As previously mentioned., in Admiral Mey-o's ultimatum to 
General Zaragoza it was stated that th= :Mexican salute would be 
returned by the Dolphin. Huerta was undoubtedly seeking not on]y a 
return salute, but also a formal agreement between his government 
and the United States which would be tantamount to recognition. If 
intervention by the United States to enforce the salute did occur, 
the various rebel factions in the country might rally under his 
leadership to resist an invading foreign power. On the other hand, 
Wilson was apparently convinced that intervention by the United 
States forces was a necessity if Hue ta was to be forced out of 
Mexico; therefore, he closed his t hinking to compromise or peaceful 
settlement of an incident that might have been nothing more than an 
insignificant historical event. 
On April 13, 1914, Wilson called John Lind to Washington in 
order to obtain his views on the Mexican situation. Lind, when 
called for advice after the end of the "honeymoon period, 11 had 
19o1Shaughnessy to Bryan (telegram), APril 19, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 472. 
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advocated military intervention if his more peaceful plans for 
ousting Huerta were unsuccessful. He now announced that "watchful 
waiting" nrust be abandoned to remove the Mexican dictator from 
20 power. On the following day, the entire Atlantic fleet of the United 
States was ordered with 11 least possible delc\Y" to Tampico. 21 By 
way of justifying this action, Wilson was quoted as saying that 11one 
of the great concerns of this Government has been that the destruc-
tion of foreign property in Mexico might cause European nations 
affected to take measures of their own to protect their interests. 1122 
As the American fleet neared Tampico, Wilson's stand became increas-
ingly bellicose. In a conference w.i. th Congressren of the Committees 
on Foreign Relations and Affairs, Wilson said that he had received 
word that Chargt 0 1Shaughnessy was conducting himself as a personal 
friend of Huerta, to the point of riding in Huerta's car. He told 
the Congressmen that 0 1Shaughnessy wruld be recalled if he could 
think of a way to replace him without recognizing Huerta. Wilson 
next outlined his plan of action whi ·h involved seizure of Vera Cruz 
and Tampico accompanied by a "peaceful blockade" of both Mexican 
20NYT, April 14, 1914, P• 1. 
21Bryan to O 'Shaughnessy, (telegram), April JJ:i, 1914. FR, 1914, 
p. 459. The fleet consisted of eight battleships and three smaller 
vessels, which carried 2,500 fully-equipped expeditionary marine forces 
capable of assault landings. 
22NYT, April 14, 1914, P• 1. 
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coasts, occupation of Mexico until Colonel Hinojosa was punished and 
the salute received, time for compliance by Mexico to be extended 
until the American fleet arrived, and, a1though he did not anticipate 
a declaration of war, he promised that unless conditions warranted 
immediate action, Congress would be consulted before sending United 
States forces into action.23 Wilson received unanimous support from 
the Committee members who stated that it was possible to overlook the 
seizure of the men at Tampico, but the arrest of the mail orderly and 
the attempt to take his dispatches demanded redress beyond a twenty-
one gun salute. 24 
President Wilson's belligerent attitude toward ¥1exico drew 
interesting comments from the British press. The Chronicle pointed 
out that Woodrow Wilson's policies were at least changing, as evidenced 
by not accepting the apology of Huerta I s general, which would not have 
cost the United States any measure of dignity. The Star claimed that 
mining interests of Great Britain had caused war in South Africa., and 
that oil magnates in Mexico were creating a comparable situation and 
were intriguing for intervention. 25 The Daily Telegram supported the 
seize 
23Ibid., April 16, 1914, P• 2. 
24Ibid. Admiral Fletcher made no reference to an attempt to 
the mail orderly 1s dispatches. See PP• 54-55 of this paper. 
25NYT, April 16, 1914, P• 2. 
contenti n tha i was totally inconsis en for the United t.ates t 
be amiable toward a "predatory" man like Pancho" Villa and he mu de s 
omm.i ted by arranza, while objecting o Huerta on the same basis 
Furthermore, The Daily Telegram added 11A Government does not demand 
apologies and salutes from an official desperad whom it has branded 
as a murderous criminal. If it cannot hold a regular national 
authority accountable for this desperado's proceedin0 s it either 
moves against him and punishes him on its own responsibility ar leaves 
him alone. 1126 The latter point was also grasped by Caranza who had 
suggested that if the United tates wanted an apology from Nexic the 
Constitutionalists would be happy to offer it thereby ignoring that 
a usurper such as Huerta could officially act for Mexico ani in 
turn elevating tre prestige of the Constitutionalists. 
On April 20, 1914 President ilson addressed a join session 
of Congress to explain the situation in Mexico. He said that the 
Tampico incident was only one of a series of incidents, and if this 
were not the case, he w::>uld be disposed to forget tre matter and 
attribute it to "ignorance and arrogance;" but, he continued., an 
orderly from the U. S. S. Minnesota was 11 twown into jail" and a message 
to the American Charg~ d I Affaires was detained by the Mexican telegraphic 
service. He added: 11We do not desire to control in any degree the affairs 
of our sister Republic ••• The people of Mexico are entitled to settle 
26Ib.d _1._ • ., April 17, 1914, P• 1. 
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their own domestic affairs in their own way, and we sincerely respect 
thel.·r r1.·ght.1127 I 1 . h k d n cone usion, ease support of a resolution to use 
United States troops to obtain recognition of the rights and dignity 
of the United States from Huerta. The resolution passed the House of 
Representatives by a margin of 323 to 29, but not before the United 
States marines occupied Mexican soil. 
The landing of Marines at Vera Cruz, Mexico, was precipitated 
by a telegram from Consul "William W. Canada stating that the freighter 
Ypiranga of the Hamburg-American Line would dock at Vera Cruz on April 
21, 1914, with a cargo of two hundred machine guns and 15,000,000 
28 
rounds of ammunition. Bryan I s reply was "Fletcher has been instructed 
to take the customhouse immediately and prevent delivery of arms and 
ammu.nition. 1129 On the morning of April 21, 1914, United States marines 
landed at Vera Cruz seizing the cable office, post office, telegraph 
office, and customhouse. Josephus Daniels had again opposed the 
majority of Wilson's cabinet who favored intervention. Daniels later 
pointed out that the only reasons for the Vera Cruz landing were to 
enforce a salute to the United States flag and prevent tre landing 
27 Congressional Record, 63 Congress., 2 Session (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1914), P• 6909. 
28consul William W. Canada to Bryan, (telegram), April 20, 
1914. FR, 1914, P• 477. 
29Bryan to Canada, (telegram), April 21, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 477. 
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of munitiol)s from the German ship. After the United States occupied 
Vera Cruz, the salute was not demanded, and following a protest by 
the German Ambassador to Washington that the United States could not 
seize the German vessel unless at war with his country, the Ypiranga 
was released. It landed refugees at New Orleans, and then returned 
to Puerto ~xico am unloaded its cargo, which presumably reached 
Huerta's forces. 30 
The occupation af Vera Cruz by American forces nearly accom-
plished what Huerta desired. Carranza maintained that tre United 
States had invaded Mexico, thus violating its right as a sovereign 
nation, and threatened to involve the two countries in an unequal 
war. The First Chief of the Constitutionalist forces insisted that 
the United States cease military actions and withdraw its farces from 
Mexican territory. Bryan informed Carranza that if he would make it 
clear that he was neutral on the occupation of Vera Cruz, the United 
States could hasten the demise of Huerta 11which all parties desire. 1131 
Simultaneous with Carranza 1s rebuke for t l e United States, "Pancho" 
Villa announced tha:t he was opposed to war with the United States 
because Mexico had enough troubles without fighting its powerful 
neighbor. In respect to the occupation of Vera Cruz, he said: "I 
hope the Amaricans bottle up Vera Cruz so tight they can't even get 
JODaniels, The Wilson Era, PP• 200-201. 
31Bryan to Consul Marion Letcrer, (telegram) April 24, 1914 . 
FR, 1914, P• 486. 
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water into it. 1132· To insure Carranza 1 s neutrality, the United States 
threatened to invoke another Arms Embargo .Act. Special Agent George 
c. Carothers at Ju£rez, Mexico, informed Washington that if the 
proposed embargo did not change Villa's attitude, he had hopes of 
establishing the neutrali-cy- of the Constitutionalists through him. 
Bryan informed Carothers that 11 the action of the United States en the 
part of the border which is controlled on the 1exican side by the 
Constitutionalists will be governed entirely by the attitude of 
General Carranza, General Villa and their associates. 1133 On the 
following day, the United States Department of State was informed 
by Consul Jesse H. Johnson that in the event of war with Mexico, 
Carranza would not fight United States troops and urn.er no circumstances 
would the Constitutionalists join forces with Huerta. 34 
The prospect of war with Mexico brought a flurry of enlistments 
in the anned forces throughout the United States, Theodore Roosevelt 
offered to return from his explorations in South America to lead a 
cavalry detachment, and military authorities speculated that 200,000 
men would be necessary to conquer and control Me.xi.co. Professor 
32NYT, April 24, 1914, P• 1. 
33Bryan to Special Agent George c. Carothers, (telegram), April 
24, 1914. FR, 1914, PP• 486-487. 
34consul Jesse H. Johnson to Bryan, (telegram), April 25, 1914. 
FR, 1914, P• 487. 
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Albert Bushnell Hart questioned that any number of troops would 
accomplish .American objectives there. He pointed out that as a 
basis for handling the problems of Mexico, the United States could 
undoubtedly draw on its experience in exterminating her own Indians, 
and its "enlightened" policy of dealing with Cuba ani the Philippines. 
To illustrate the last point he said, 11Sixteen years we have been 
civilizing the Filipinos up to the point where they are unanimous 
only on one thing, namely, that they want us to leave. 11 35 The 
press in South .American countries was bitterly anti-American, and 
suspicious of the United States motives in Mexico. The Argentine 
paper, La Naci6n, claimed that the independence of Mexico was 
threatened and caustically compared Wilson's foreign policy with 
that of Theodore Roosevelt - 11 The academic rectitude of the one 
produces the same effect as the big stick of the other. 1136 
On April 25, 1914, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered 
their good offices to mediate the di f ferences between the United 
States and Mexico. The United States accepted the offer without 
hesitation, for it did not desire a war with Mexico, and unless a 
peaceful settlement could be made, it stood to incur the further 
35 Albert Bushnell Hart, 11 The Postulates of the Mexican 
Situation II The Annals: International Relations of the United 
States, 1fv (July, 19i4), P• i47. 
J6trrT, April 25, 1914, P• 3. 
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enmity and suspicion of the Latin-American nations. On April 27, 
1914, under pressure by diplomatic representatives of France , 
Germany, and Britain, Huerta agreed in principle to mediation with 
the United States and indicated that he would send delegates to 
the conference. Thus the preliminary agreerent to mediate their 
differences was agreed upon by the United States and the Provisional 
Goverrurent of Victoriano Huerta, thereby leying the foundation for 
the Niagara Conferenceo 
CHAPTER V 
THE NIAGARA CONFERENCE 
The purpose of the Niagara Conference, as set forth by the 
ministers plenipotentaries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,1 was 
to prevent further bloodshed between the United States and Mexico 
by effecting a peaceful settlement of tre Tampico incident and 
securing the withdrawal of .American farces from Vera Cruz. Con-
tingent upon the acceptance of mediation was the understanding that 
all "hostilities and military movements by the forces of both 
parties" be suspended during mediatory action. 2 It is apparent 
that the topics for discussion did not include the removal of 
Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico, but Bryan stated that 
the United States would not accept terms of T!Ediation short of the 
elimination of Huerta and the establishment of a government in 
compliance with the National Constitution of Mexico. 3 The incon-
sistency of negotiating with a government which the United States 
1senores Romulo S. Na6n of Argentina, Dornicio da Gama of 
Brazil, and Eduardo Su~ez Mujica of Chile. 
2The ABC Mediators to Secretary of State William J. Bryan, 
(telegram), April 28, 1914. Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1914 (Washington: United States 
Government-Printing Office, 1922),p. 493. Hereinafter cited 
as FR. 
3The New York Times, April 26, 1914, p. 1. Hereinafter 
cited as NYT-.- --
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had refused to recognize did not disturb Wilson, "for he never 
had any intention of submitting to genuine mediation. 114 Furthermore, 
if the removal of Huerta was an inevitable consequence of mediation, 
the fact that his government was represented on an equal basis w.i.th 
that of the United States was of no significance and thus precluded 
any future question of extending recognition. To Woodrow Wilson, 
the Niagara Conference was an effective "means of eliminating Huerta 
and establishing a provisional government that would turn Mexico 
over to the Constitutionalists~S On April 29, 1914, Carranza agreed 
in principle to mediation, but stated that the details of negotia-
tions nmst be discussed at a "later time. 116 The mediators warned 
Carranza that as a consequence of accepting their good offices, he 
must suspend hostilities innnediately and continue this policy as 
long as mediation lasted. The Constitutionalist Chief replied 
that to cease military operations was "inadvisable for the Con-
stitutionalist cause," and that the civil war in Mexico had nothing 
dt · f diti 7 to do with the propose opics o me a on. Because of Carranza's 
4Arthur s. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 
1910-1917 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1954), P• 126. Here-
inafter cited as Link, Woodrow Wilson. 
5Ibid. 
6venustiano Carranza to the Mediators, (telegram), April 29, 
1914. FR., 1914, P• 517. 
7 ~•, May 3, 1914, P• 518. 
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refusal to abide by the terms of mediation, the mediators with-
drew their invitation to the Constitutionalists to attend the 
conference. 
Wilson selected Justice Jooeph Rucker Lamar and Mr. Frederick 
William Lehmann, who were totally uninformed about Mexico, as United 
States delegates to the Niagara Conference. No one was sent from 
the United States Department of State, nor were the .American delegates 
given plenary powers! Any action taken by them was ad referendum, 
meaning that all suggestions had to be referred to the Anerican State 
8 Department before a decision could be made. On the other hand, 
Huerta I s delegates, Senores Emilo Rab as a, Agustin Rodr{quez, and 
Luis Elguero, ~horoughly understood the problems to be discussed 
and were given full plenary powers. 
On May 13, 1914, the mediators announced that the objectives 
of the conference would include the elimination of Huerta as Provi-
sional President of Mexico and the establishment of a Mexican govern-
ment which both Huerta and the Constitutionalists would accept. It 
is significant that settlement of the Tampico incident was not 
mentioned, while the exact objectives of the United States had 
become the premises of negotiation. The Niagara Conference, 
scheduled to open on May 18, 1914, was postponed for two days at 
BNYT, McV 14, 1914, p. 1. 
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the request of Huerta's delegates. Ostensibly his delegates 
claimed they were too weary from their trip to the United States 
to enter the conference, but they apparently desired to delay 
mediation until further instructions arrived from Huerta. On Mey 
18, 1914, the Mexican delegates announced that Huerta was willing 
to resign if it were necessary to attain peaceful settlement of the 
dispute between the United States and Mexico. Huerta asked that he 
have a voice in choosing his successor and procurement of an 
American loan of four hundred million dollars. 9 Perhaps his will-
ingness to resign was based on the military successes of the 
Constitutionalists who had captured Tampico on~ 13, 1914. 
The ABC ministers set forth their proposals on May 20, 1914, 
for the settlement of affairs in Mexico. Huerta was to appoint 
as his successor a Minister of Foreign Affairs10 who would be 
acceptable to the Constitutionalists and the United States; the 
United States should place an embargo on arms and nnmitions going 
to Mexico as soon as Huerta tendered his resignation; and free 
11 
elections should be held to choose a President and legislative body. 
It would seem that with Huerta's elimination a certainty, the United 
9Ibid., Mey 19, 1914, P• 1. 
lOPedro Lascurain, Madero's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
was suggested by the mediators. 
11special Commissioners of the United States to Bryan, 
(telegram), May 20, 1914. FR, 1914, P• 501. 
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States would have accepted the proposals of the I1Ediators; but Bryan 
began a series of delays and postponements without which the Niagara 
Conference might have quickly terminated, by suggesting that a number 
of names be submitted for consideration as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
so that their "connections and sympathies" could be checked.12 Addi-
tional evidence that Wilson understood the socio-economic aspects of 
the Mexican problem and had shifted from a moralistic approach to the 
realization that civil war must continue in Mexico until land reform 
was accomplished, was revealed in a conversation With Samuel G. 
Blythe of The Saturday Evening Post on April 27, 191.L.. "It [ the 
land probleni] is a great and complicated question, but I have 
every hope that a suitable solution Wiil be found, and that the 
day will come when the Mexican people will be put in full possession 
of the land, 
Bryan suggested that since the Constitutionalists had a 
commanding position in Mexico, the mediators should again extend 
them an invitation to attend the conference without defining the 
scope of the discussions or requiring a suspension of hostilities. 
The mediators refused to do so, stating that the Constitutionalists 
12Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), Mey 21, 19lil• FR, 191.L., 
P• 502. The mediators submitted as alternate choices Rafael Angeles, 
Ernesto Madero, and Luis Cabrera. 
l3As quoted in Samuel G. Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a 
Conversation with President Wilson, 11 The Saturday Evening Post, 
CLXXXVI (May 23, 191.L.), P• 71. 
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had expressed a determination not to discuss any domestic reforms with 
respect to Mexico. Huerta's representatives, claiming that mediation 
was virtually impossible as long as hostilities continued, proposed an 
armistice or an embargo, which they maintained would produce the same 
effect as an armistice, on United States shipments of munitions to 
Mexico. If the conditions of either the armistice or embargo were 
fulfilled and a provisional government established to prevent 
anarchial conditions in the capital, Huerta would resign imrnediately.1.4 
Bryan refused to consider the embargo and said that Huerta's represent-
atives apparently wanted the United States to intervene and stop the 
revolution in Mexico. He added that 11it is clear that the 
representatives from Mexico are keen~r aware that General Huerta no 
longer has the force or standing to insist on anything; • 
The conference continued throughout May and June of 1914 with 
nothing of real significance occurring. This was due to the previously 
mentioned disinclination of the Unite1 States to submit to genuine 
mediation, the refusal of the Constitutionalists to meet the require-
ments for representation, and the continued insistence of Carranza 
that he would not submit to any settlement of Mexico I s internal affairs 
14 to Bryan, (telegram), May 23, 1914. FR, 1914, Commissioners 
P• 505. 
15Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), May 24, 1914. FR, 1914i 
P• 505. 
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by the Niagara Conference. Periodically, Carranza would indicate 
that under certain circumstances he might send delegates to the 
conference. After such En indication was made on May 28, 1914, 
Bryan suggested that 11 ti.me will be gained by waiting to arrange this 
and all the processes of the nediation will be facilitated by the 
admission of representatives of Carranza. 1116 The mediators were not 
impressed. They pointed out that Carranza's apparent willingness to 
send delegates was a delaying tactic providing him with more time 
to crush Huerta's forces, and that unless an armistice was declared 
Carranza would control all of Mexico thereby casting the Niagara 
Conference in a ridiculous light.17 The fact that the United States 
delegates were not vested with authority to make decisions did not 
expedite proceedings, for their correspondence to the American State 
Department was lengthy, detailed, and burdened with minutiae of 
questions and proposals. 
The proceedings at Niagara were conducted in an air of secrecy 
and press coverage was not permitted. When asked by Gregoiy Mason, 
a reporter from The Outlook magazine, to provide information about 
what was occurring at the conference, Justice Lamar refused comment 
16 Bryan to Commissioners, (telegram), May 29, 19114. FR, 19114, 
P• 512. 
17c . . onnm.ss 1.oners to Bryan, (telegram), May JO, 1914. FR, 1914, 
P• 514. 
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seying that it was excellent that no one lmew what was going on. Mason 
remarked that this attitude was not consistent with Wilson's professed 
faith in an informed public. He added that the policy of the Wilson 
administration was apparently more coreernad with the number of 
mistresses kept by the Constitutionalists and the amount of liquor 
consumed by them, rather than their intended reforms.18 Mason's 
criticism of moral criteria in government seems justified, but even 
in a democracy, secrecy is usually mandatory at international confer-
ences, and The Outlook magazine, with Theodore Roosevelt as a contri-
buting editor, was decidedly anti-Wilson in sentiment. 
On Mey 31, 1914, Bryan glibly argued that since the Consti-
tutionalists were not represented at Niagara, the United States 
would have to be the judge of what would be a 11f air 11 settlement 
between Huerta and Carranza, without any adequate means of reaching 
that judgment.19 Bryan added that the refusal to seat the Con-
stitutionalists at Niagara cast doubt on the impartiality of the 
20 mediators, which they could not 11successful]y explain away. 11 The 
18Gregory Mason, "Mediation without Information," The Outlook, 
CVII (June 27, 1914), P• 446. 
19This statemmt erroneously implies that the United States 
was not in contact with the Constitutionalists. Luis Cabrera, a 
representative of Carranza, served as informant to the Anl:?rican 
State Department, and diplomatic correspondence was carried on 
between Special .Agent George c. Carothers at Torrec5n, Mexico, and 
Washington. See PP• 47-50 of this paper, also FR, 1914, PP• 494, 
542. 
20Bryan to Comrnissioneni, ( ~le gram), May 31, 1914. FR, 1914, 
p. 520. 
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mediators steadfastly maintained that while they were anxious that 
Carranza be represented, an invitation would not be granted until 
the First Lhief of the Constitutionalists agreed to abide by the 
results of the conference and cease military action against Huerta. 
On June 11, 1914, Carranza pointedly remarked that he had 
accepted the principle of mediation as early as April 29, 194, and 
in lieu of this acceptance announced the names of three delegates, 21 
although he did not state that he would send them to the Niagara 
Conference. On July 13, 1914, the United States delegates initiated 
a proposal that a Constitutionalist be chosen Previsianal President 
of Mexico, fa~ as Commissioner Lehmann observed, it w-as illogical to 
assume that Carranza would accept less from mediation than he could 
22 
accomplish by armed force. Three days after this proposal the 
representatives of Carranza met with the United States commissioners 
at Buffalo, New York, to set forth the views of the Constitutionalists 
who then occupied nearly all of Mexico. In reply to the Americans 1 
suggestions that they accept the favorable terms, secured by United 
States efforts on their behalf, that were forthcoming in the Niagara 
Conference, the Mexicans stated that settlement of Mexican internal 
affairs in which the United States w.as:a part would not be acceptable. 
21senores Luis Cabrera, Iglesias Calder6n, and Jos6 
Vasconcelos. 
22 w· · L hm t C . . L . Commissioner illiam e ann o omrru.ssioner uis 
Elguero, (memorandum), June 13, 1914. FR, 1914, P• 533. 
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Carranza's delegates further refused to abide by any decisions of 
mediation even if it was exactly what trey wanted. In the words 
of the United States commissioners, 11 They [ Carranza I s delegateru 
declined to discuss names or propose names for provisional presi-
dent, saying that no one would be satisfactory that was appointed 
by the Mediators, even if it was Carranza himself, because anything 
that came from the Mediators would not be accepted by their party or 
by the Mexican people. 11 23 
The Niagara Conference was unquestionably a failure. It did 
not touch the problems that prcmpted its inception, nor did it 
resolve the more broad objectives mediated at the insistence of the 
United States, for the only Mexican party capable of implementing 
civil reforms was the non-participating Constitutionalists. The 
conference adjourned on July 2, 1914, after the United States 
commissioners and Huerta's delegates had signed a protocol agreeing 
to the resignation of Huerta as Provisional President of Mexico, 
which was devoid of significance; for the ousting of Huerta and the 
ascendancy of Carranza were almost certain without a conference. 24 
On July 15, 1914, Huerta resigned and appointed as his successor, 
23commissioners to Bryan., (telegram), June 16., 1914. FR, 1914., 
P• 538. 
24Paul D. Dickens, 11Argentine .Arbitrations and Mediations 
with Reference to the United States Participation Therein, 11 The 
HisEani~ .American Historical Review., XI (November., 1931)., 
P• 84. 
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Francisco Carbajal. Shortly thereafter, Huerta left Puerto ME{xico 
for European exile abroard the ship that had carried Diaz to exile 
and had triggered United States intervention, the Ypiranga. 
The question arises as to whether Wilson wanted the Niagara 
Conference to be a success or a failure. He could have restored 
the Arms Embargo Act and effected a status quo between the Constitu-
tionalists and the Federal forces, thereby bringing pressure to bear 
on Carranza and forcing him to accept Ill:ldiation. Had he done so, he 
would have aroused the wrath of the Constitutionalists and deprived 
them of a rallying asset that accompanied military victory. According 
to Josi Vasconcelos, Wilson "was not loath to see the Niagara Confer-
ence converted into a failure. 1125 However, as subsequent events 
indicated, Wilson had no intention of losing a directing hand in 
Mexico, and it is inconceivable that he intended to allow Carranza 
unfettered control of Mexico. He therefore insured tra military 
victory of the Constitutionalists by supplying them arms, while 
demanding concessions at Niagara which seemingly embodied every-
thing that they could desire. He hoped that Carranza would enter 
the conference at the last minute and accept his proffer of "kind-
ness," and in return, Wilson could strive for the socio-economic 
reforms he felt were necessary for Mexico by manipulating Carranza. 
25J. Fred Rippy, JosJ Vasconcelos, am Guy Stevens, Alrerican 
Policies Abroad: Mexico (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1928), P• 120. 
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Wilson's predicament after the Buffalo, New York, meeting is superbly 
presented by Professor Arthur S. Link: 
Carranza 1 s absolute refusal to allow Wilson to use the 
ABC mediation to settle tre civil war ••• was final and 
complete proof that the Revolution was out of American 
control. And it was out of contra 1 at the very moment 
when the cumulative effect of American policies were 
making possible the triumph of the revolutionary forces. 
In short, Wilson had made possible the success of a move-
ment for which he had assumed responsibility before the 
British governmegt, yet over which he could exercise no 
real direction. 2 
Almcs t immediately following Huerta I s resignation, an irrepar-
able split occurred between Villa and Carranza. Although the breach 
between the Constitutionalist leaders was to plunge Mexico into an-
other civil war,_ it was regarded by Bryan and Wilson as not altoget-
her unfortunate, and 11 the deposing of Carranza and the enthroning of 
2~ 
Villa now became the chief objective of the .American government." 1 
Wilson's support of Villa was completely inconsistent with his 
concepts of morality, for Villa 11was guilty of • • • wanton killings 
without number which spared neither sex, age, nor class, ••• Pulling 
f h d . . 1128 Chinese apart with horses was one o is iversions. This unfortun-
ate error in judgI1Ent on Wilson I s part was due to Villa 1s willingness 
26Link, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 127-128. 
27 Ibid., P• 129. 
28Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York: 
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942),p~Jll-312. 
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to be a tool of Wilsonian diplomacy and his support of the United 
States occupation of Vera Cruz, as well as .American disaffection 
for the stubbornness of Carranza. A5 a consequence of this deci-
sion, John Lind was dismissed because of his pro-Carranza sentinent 
and replaced by an able lawyer, Paul Fuller. Fuller was sent to 
Mexico with a Wilsonian proposal for the establishment of a new 
provisional government. The Mexican revolutionary leaders met at 
Aguascalientes, Mexico, on October 12, 1914, to organize a compromise 
government; however, Villa dominated the conference and chose General 
Eulalia Guiterrez, a Villista, as President. Carranza withdrew from 
the conference followed by the most able Mexican generals and the civil 
war continued with the United States diplomatically supporting the 
forces of Villa. 29 
On June 23, 1915, Robert Lansing became Secretary of State, 
and through his direction coupled with the disasterous defeat of 
Villa by Alvaro Obregtn, formal recognition was extended to 
Venustiano Carranza on October 19, 1915. Although the United 
States did not have control of the situation in Mexico, Wilson knew 
that the war in Europe would occupy the attention of foreign countries, 
who, without this diversion, might agitate for intervention in Mexico 
to protect their investments. Furthermore, in the event of United 
States irivolvenent in World War I, it would be well to have a 
friendly nation on its southern border. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A filajor departure from the traditional American policy of 
recognition occurred during the administration of President wocxirow 
Wilson. To determine the legitimacy of a government on the basis 
of morality, constitutionality, democratic principles , or any 
criterion other than its ability to maintain law, order, stability, 
and its power to meet international obligations, creates a perilous 
diplomatic situation. If a nation, such as the United States, denies 
de facto recognition to a government on premises not adhered to by 
other sovereign states, it places that nation in the untenable posi-
tion of ultimately altering its own criteria of recognition or 
enjoining other nations into an acceptance of its own independent 
policy. Wilson was able to accomplish the latter, not because Great 
Britain accepted United States principles of recognition, but be-
cause the relative economic and military strength of the United 
States and Mexico made cordial relations with the first feasible, 
at the risk of incurring enmity of the ~econd. A nation must pursue 
a policy aimed at the optimum realization of its o,m objectives, what-
ever these objectives may be, which accounts for Great Britain's tacit 
approval for Wilson's policy, although it was wholly inconsistent with 
its own established policy of recognition. 
If Woodrow Wilson was determined to use moral criteria as a 
base for recognition, which he was, it was illogical to destroy 
Huerta unless he could be supplanted by someone more moralistic. 
Bo 
11Pancho 11 Villa or Venustiano Carranza, the leading contenders 
to succeed Huerta, certainly did not meet this requirement. Wilson I s 
lack of acuity of foreign affairs is to a degree excusable, for he 
did not profess to be an expert on this subject, and his Presidential 
platform was oriented toward domestic issues. Although Wilson 
justifiably distrusted Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, his decision 
to employ John Lind and John Bayard Hale, emissaries without diplo-
matic experience and as lacking in sound knowledge of foreign affairs 
as himself, was an unfortunate error in judgment, for it was his 
unquestionable prerogative to recall Ambassador Wilson . The fact 
that Henry Lane Wilson was allowed to remain in Mexico for five 
months after the establishment of the Provisional Goverrment of 
Victoriano Huerta attests to the indecisiveness of "watchful waiting" 
diplomacy, however, it is to Wilson's credit that he resisted for a 
time the demands of the expansionists and the advocates of direct 
intervention. 
Military intervention was precipitated by ulterior motives 
on the part of both Woodrow Wilson and Huerta. The arrest of the 
American sailors in the whale boat at Tampico was undeniably a 
violation of extraterritorial rights, but a violation that a power-
ful nation could overlook after an innnediate apology was presented 
by a state torn by civil war. The 11 arrest 11 of the United States 
paymaster and the detention of confidential information to the 
American Embas~ were intentionally released to United States Congress-
men and to the American public as inflammatory propaganda to justify 
81 
intervention and to insure United States direction of Mexican 
internal reforms. Huerta's motives for bickering over the terms 
of the salute were aimed at precipitating American intervention, 
for with both Mexican coasts blockaded and with the Constitutionalists' 
right to procure munitions from the United States, Huerta's political 
demise was inevitable. The invasion of .Mexico by the "Colossus of 
the North11 was his only chance of survival, for he hoped it would 
unite all Mexican factions against a common eneIJ\V. 
The Niagara Conference was an excellent opportunity for the 
United States to mollify Latin-American suspicions of its imperialistic 
designs, but the origLnal purpose of the conference, settlement of the 
Tampico incident, was circumvented by the United &tates. The fact 
that the Constitutionalists were never a party to tlE mediation 
reduced too significance of it to farcical proportions and frustrated 
Woodrow Wilson I s desire to insure domestic reforms in Mexico. 
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